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RESISTING DEEP CAPTURE
[W]hen men [and women] have realized that time has upset
many fighting faiths, they may come to believe ... that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market....
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.'
-Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
While it is ,true that an important objective of the First
Amendment is to foster the free flow of information,
identification of speech that falls within its protection is not
aided by the metaphorical reference to a "marketplace of
ideas." There is no reason for believing that the
marketplace of ideas is free from market imperfections any
more than there is to believe that the invisible hand will
always lead to optimum economic decisions in the
commercial market.
-- (Then) Justice William Rehnquist
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent article, Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in
America, my co-authors and I examined the ways in which the food
industry has exercised powerful influence, often in unseen ways,
over consumer behavior in the fast food market, even as the industry
has evaded responsibility for the ensuing obesity epidemic by
promoting to regulators, as well as to consumers themselves, the
view that consumer behavior in the food market reflects the
preference driven choices of individual consumers, which the
industry claims merely to satisfy.
3
1. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
2. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 592 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
3. Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, Broken Scales:
Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645 (2004) [hereinafter
Broken Scales]. Of course, Broken Scales is just one piece in an extensive, and
growing, body of scholarship dedicated to understanding the relationship
between food industry practice and the obesity epidemic. See, e.g., KELLY D.
BROWNELL & KATHERINE BATTLE HOGEN, FOOD FIGHT: THE INSIDE STORY
OF THE FOOD INDuSTRY, AMERICA'S OBESITY CRISIS, AND WHAT WE CAN Do
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Broken Scales sought to apply, in the context of the obesity
epidemic, an innovative approach to legal theory that my co-authors
and I call "critical realism."4 Broken Scales was chiefly concerned
with applying this innovative conceptual framework to a broad
analysis of the fundamental legal-theoretic and social policy issues
surrounding the obesity crisis. The present Article is more precisely
dedicated to analyzing, from a critical realist perspective, the wisdom
and constitutional viability of one possible policy response to the
obesity crisis: a ban on junk-food6 advertising to children. 7
This Article seeks not only to show that an effective junk-food
advertising ban could pass constitutional scrutiny, but also to
demonstrate, through the rigor of a constitutional analysis, the
wisdom of such an approach to this substantial social problem.
Simultaneously, my purpose is to show, in the context of a difficult
First Amendment question, that the critical realist approach to legal
theory is capable of yielding substantial analytic insights,
jurisprudential innovations, and public policy contributions.
8
II. THE CASE FOR BANNING JuNK-FOOD ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN
A. It's Hard to Put it Better than Justice Thomas
The case for banning junk-food advertising to children was
made succinctly and persuasively by Justice Thomas in a recent case
involving Massachusetts's ultimately unsuccessful effort to ban, inter
alia, tobacco billboard advertising directed at children9 :
ABOUT IT (2004) (elaborating Brownell and Battle's conception of "the toxic
environment" and its relationship to overweight and obesity).
4. For a brief synopsis of critical realism, see Part II.B.1.
5. Broken Scales, supra note 3.
6. For the purposes of this Article, the term "junk food" refers to highly
caloric food that is relatively high in sugar and/or fat content and relatively low
in nutritional value. There may be debate at the periphery about what food
products qualify for this categorization, but that debate is not crucial to the
analytic issues under review.
7. Below, I will argue that an effective ban on junk-food advertising to
children must be conceived of programmatically, and for the purposes of
constitutional analysis, as involving a substantial limitation on such advertising
to adults as well as children, and thus as a near total ban on junk-food
advertising altogether. See infra text accompanying notes 150-152.
8. See infra note 21 (summarizing other work in critical realism).
9. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
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The second largest contributor to mortality rates in the
United States [after "tobacco use"] is obesity1101  It is
associated with increased incidence of diabetes,
hypertension, and coronary artery disease, and it represents
a public health problem that is rapidly growing worse.[
1'
Although the growth of obesity over the last few decades
has had many causes, a significant factor has been the
increased availability of large quantities of high-calorie,
high-fat foods.1 21  Such foods, of course, have been
aggressivel marketed and promoted by fast food
companies.
[ 31
Respondents say that tobacco companies are covertly
targeting children in their advertising. Fast food companies
do so openly.... Moreover, there is considerable evidence
that they have been successful in changing children's eating
behavior. [ 141 The effect of advertising on children's eating
habits is significant for two reasons. First, childhood
obesity is a serious health problem in its own right.["]l
Second, eating preferences formed in childhood tend to
persist in adulthood.1161 So even though fast food is not
addictive in the same way tobacco is, children's exposure to
fast food advertising can have deleterious consequences that
are difficult to reverse.
17
10. Id. at 587 (citing Jeffrey P. Koplan & William H. Dietz, Caloric
Imbalance and Public Health Policy, 282 JAMA 1579 (1999)).
11. Id. (citing Ali H. Mokdad et al., The Spread of the Obesity Epidemic in
the United States, 1991-1998, 282 JAMA 1519 (1999)).
12. Id. (citing James 0. Hill & John C. Peters, Environmental Contributions
to the Obesity Epidemic, 280 SCIENCE 1371 (1998)).
13. Id. (citing Marion Nestle & Michael F. Jacobson, Halting the Obesity
Epidemic: A Public Health Policy Approach, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human
Services, 115 PUB. HEALTH REP. 12, 18 (2000)).
14. Id. at 588 (citing Dina L. G. Borzekowski & Thomas N. Robinson, The
30-Second Effect: An Experiment Revealing the Impact of Television
Commercials on Food Preferences of Preschoolers, 101 J. AM. DIETETIC
ASS 'N 42 (2001); Howard L. Taras et al., Television's Influence on Children's
Diet and Physical Activity, 10 J. DEv. & BEHAV. PEDIATRICS 176 (1989)).
15. Id. at 588 (citing Richard P. Troiano & Katherine M. Flegal,
Overweight Children and Adolescents, 101 PEDIATRICS 497 (1998)).
16. Id. (citing Leann L. Birch & Jennifer 0. Fisher, Development of Eating
Behaviors Among Children and Adolescents, 101 PEDIATRICS 539 (1998)).
17. Id. at 587-88 (Thomas, J., concurring).
May 2006]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:507
Thomas meant his exegesis here facetiously. It was a step in his
argument, concurring with the Court's holding in Lorillard Tobacco
Co. v. Reilly, that the First Amendment forbids Massachusetts's
tobacco advertising restrictions.' 8 His purpose in the passage above,
apparently, was to point to the absurdity of banning junk-food
advertising as support for his view that the tobacco-advertising ban at
issue in Lorillard was unconstitutional. 19 In Part III, below, I will
engage the constitutional issues posed by a ban on junk-food
advertising to children. 20  For present purposes, however, irony
aside, Thomas's summary provides an excellent starting point for
appreciating the enormity of the childhood obesity problem, and the
role that junk-food advertising plays in it.
B. Fleshing Out the Case
1. Critical Realism and the Situational Character
Before further examining the relationship between childhood
obesity and junk-food advertising, and the wisdom of an advertising
ban, it is crucial to first establish the critical realist perspective.
2 1
18. Id. at 589-90 (Thomas, J., concurring).
19. The quotation above is preceded by Thomas's warning that "it seems
appropriate to point out that to uphold the Massachusetts tobacco regulations
would be to accept a line of reasoning that would permit restrictions on
advertising for a host of other products." Id. at 587.
20. See infra Part III.
21. Professor Hanson and I explicated the basic elements of critical realism
in Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture,
102 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003) [hereinafter, Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation].
In a companion article, Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational
Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L. J.
1 (2004) [hereinafter Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character], we
provided a full-length assessment of the social science on which the model of
human agency adopted in critical realism is based. In Broken Scales, we
joined with Adam Benforado to apply critical realism to an analysis of the
obesity problem. Broken Scales, supra note 3. For other applications and
elaborations of critical realism, see also Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The
Costs of Dispositionism: The Premature Demise of Situationist Law and
Economics, 64 MD. L. REV. 24 (2005); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson,
Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and
Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103 (2004); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson,
The illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and
Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2004).
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Critical realism begins legal analysis with a conception of
human agency that differs dramatically from that adopted in much
conventional legal theory, but one that is very familiar to other social
sciences that are dedicated to studying how humans actually think
and behave. Deeply steeped in social psychology, and allied social
sciences, critical realism strives to establish a perspective on human
agency that transcends our intuitive conception of the sources of our
own conduct, especially in those areas of experience where our
intuitions about ourselves may be wrong, or misguided. To that end,
critical realism embraces a counterintuitive sensitivity to profoundly
influential, though largely hidden, cognitive, biological, and
psychological processes that encourage us humans to view our own
behavior, and other peoples' behavior, as being driven largely by the
dictates of individual disposition, and to miss the pervasive
situational influences on behavior. 22 Critical realism refers to this
distorted self-conception, which all humans share to varying degrees,
as dispositionism, because it magnifies the role of disposition and
misses the powerful role of unseen situational influence on human
behavior.
23
The figure of the "rational actor" that has become so widespread
in legal analysis through the influence of the law and economics
movement is a formalized elaboration of the basic dispositionist
misconception. 24  The rational actor, in essence, is an actor who
22. "Disposition" refers to our intuitive experience of our own thoughts, in
particular our own individually ordered opinions and preferences which we
carry within us to different behavioral contexts, and our intuitive experience of
our own will manifesting our dispositions in our behavior. See generally
Hanson & Yosifon The Situational Character, supra note 21, at 6-31
(elaborating this conception of disposition and dispositionism). "Situational
influences," as Hanson and I use the phrase, represent those features of the
external world-the framing of information, for example, which influence our
thoughts and behaviors in ways we do not appreciate, instead mistakenly
attributing the sources of our thoughts and behaviors to our own dispositions.
Somewhat more subtly, we also refer to "internal" situational influences,
which are those features of our inner lives-our cognitive biases, knowledge
structures, motivations, visceral factors, etc.-which influence profoundly our
thinking and behavior, but which are opaque to our conscious awareness of
ourselves. See generally id. at 32-36 (elaborating this notion of internal and
external situation).
23. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 21, at 250-59
(discussing cross-cultural differences in degrees of dispositionism).
24. See id. at 144-52 (scrutinizing the "myth of the rational actor").
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attempts to maximize her own preferences by making rational
choices among options that are available to her. The
dispositional/rational actor's preferences are thought, in our intuitions
and in the model, to be "revealed" through the choices she freely
makes, especially in market contexts.25 Such presumptions pervade
the law and legal theory, which, together with much of our intuitive
thinking about ourselves, may be described as unduly dispositionist
in failing to perceive and comprehend the significance of situational
influences on human behavior.
In an effort to retire and replace the "rational actor" and its
dispositionist cousins, and to fashion a more critically informed
model of human behavior for use in legal theory, Professor Hanson
and I introduced a figure that we call the "situational character."
26
The situational character encapsulates central lessons about human
agency that emerge from the fields of social psychology, political
theory, behavioralism, and economics, while highlighting the
misconceptions that permeate so much conventional thinking about
human behavior in lay and legal theoretic discourse.27 Our character
derives from many overlapping areas of social scientific research,
which we examine at length in The Situational Character: A Critical
Realist Approach to the Human Animal.28
A summary of some of the salient points of that Article serves as
necessary background for this Article: We humans have limited
perceptive and cognitive capacity. 29 We take in and make sense of
only limited aspects of the world around us.30 We have thus, of
necessity, developed heuristics-cognitive "rules of thumb"-that
"Behavioral law and economics" has emerged as a movement seeking to adapt
some lessons of various social and psychological sciences to try to make the
"rational actor" more realistic. In Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational
Character, we argue that this work has been characterized by far-too dedicated
a commitment to the basic rational actor model, and basic dispositionist
presumptions. See id. (analyzing "Five Types of Inadequate Realism").
25. In economics, this is known as the "generalized axiom of revealed
preferences." See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note
21, at 152-70.
26. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 21, at 149-79; see
also Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 21.
27. Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 21.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 152-54.
30. Id.
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allow us to make sense of the world and move in it without having to
constantly perform an exhaustive analysis of what is actually going
on in the world.31 These rules of thumb serve us well, but they are
imperfect, and they lead to systematic biases in our thinking.
32
Among these biases, or, really, a way of theorizing across our
aggregated biases, is dispositionism.33 Our conscious awareness is
limited to a few highly salient features of the external world (most
prominently, ourselves moving in it), and a few highly salient
features of our inner lives (such as our conscious thoughts,
preferences, and the experiences of will-collectively, our
dispositions).34 Unless there is some highly salient situational
influence clearly overbearing dispositional choice-a proverbial
"gun to the head"35-we mistakenly attribute our own and other
people's behavior to those limited features of our external and
internal worlds of which we are consciously aware, to the exclusion
of appreciating the ways in which we are moved by powerful
situational influences in the world around us, and unseen features of
the world within us.
36
Also fundamental to the situational character, yet absent both
from the formal rational actor model and the intuitions behind the
usually unnamed dispositional actor prevalent in conventional legal
theory, are powerful internal motivations that shape our receipt and
processing of information, and drive us towards opinions and
behaviors in ways that we do not appreciate.,3 7 We are motivated, for
example, to view ourselves in a self-affirming fashion.38  We are
further motivated, as social psychologists have well documented, 39 to
view in an affirmative fashion the groups and social systems of
31. Id. at 167-74.
32. Id. at 157-66.
33. Id.
34. See BRUCE G. CHARLTON, PSYCHIATRY AND THE HUMAN CONDITION
app. (2000) (discussing the evolution and cognitive neuroscience of awareness
and consciousness).
35. See, e.g., Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 21,
at 167-74 (developing the notion of highly salient situational influence through
the use of a hypothetical situational character threatened by a gunman).
36. See id. at 90-114 (reviewing dozens of social scientific experiments
that reveal and elaborate these concepts).
37. See id.
38. See id. at 138.
39. Id.
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which we are a part. 40 We tend to receive and process information in
a manner that supports these motivations. 41 They are a central and
powerful feature of our inner lives and they continually give shape to
our interactions with the external world-but we are usually blind to
them. Even as we engage in motivated reasoning regarding
ourselves, our groups, and our social system, we believe ourselves to
be reasoning objectively, fairly, and rationally. 42 It is in this sense
that these motivations are situational; though hidden, they constitute
an influential aspect of our situational character.43 The fact that we
tend not to appreciate the influence of these motivations on our
thoughts and behaviors contributes substantially to our
dispositionism.44
Beneath these cognitive and motivational processes are deeply
laden "visceral factors," which influence us profoundly, but which
we tend not to see, or if we do see, often misunderstand.45  Such
visceral factors include our eating and sexual systems, and also, at a
deeper remove, our experience of will.46 Consider the eating system,
apropos as it is to the present inquiry.47 We humans tend to believe
that our experience of hunger is directly related to our body's
imminent need for food. We eat because we are hungry, and believe
we feel hungry because we need to eat. But we are mistaken.
40. See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 430
(1999).
41. See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 80-81
(1991) (discussing the tendency of group members to develop "group-serving
bias.").
42. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 21, at
155-57.
43. Internal situational influences such as motivations are particularly
vulnerable to external situational manipulation, because their operation is
largely hidden from our conscious scrutiny. See Broken Scales, supra note 3,
at 1694-99 (describing specific examples of corporate manipulation of
consumer motivations).
44. See id. at 1708-11.
45. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 21, at
120-22 (discussing visceral factors).
46. See id. at 128-33 (describing the experience of will as the crown-jewel
of the dispositional self-conception); Broken Scales, supra note 3, at 1675-87
(discussing the human eating system).
47. Cf David Yosifon, The Costs of Pornography: Sexual Exploitation and
Deep Capture (in progress) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(analyzing the consumer market in pornography).
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Scientists have demonstrated that our experience of hunger is largely
unrelated to our body's imminent or even short-term need for food.48
Instead, the symptoms that we associate with the experience of
hunger, for example a palpable drop in blood sugar, are actually
caused by the body's eating system preparing itself for the
anticipated intake of food, and the massive amount of blood sugar
that comes with it.49 Thus, hunger is caused not so much by the
body's need for food, but by the body's anticipation of eating. Now,
scientists have also demonstrated that due to the fact that the problem
of food scarcity has bedeviled human society throughout most of our
history on Earth, we long-ago evolved eating systems that are
oriented towards consuming as much food as possible, especially
highly caloric food, whenever food is available, irrespective of the
body's present energy needs.50 The body stores excess energy as fat
for use during lean times.51 This may have served us well in times of
food scarcity, but in the modem world, where for many food is made
more or less constantly available, it can be powerfully misleading,
even deadly. Visceral factors such as hunger and eating
fundamentally shape our situational character, yet their influence is
obscure to our intuitive experience of ourselves.
52
The fact that situation is both highly influential and unseen
suggests that where situation can be controlled, situational characters
can be influenced in ways they will tend not to appreciate. Indeed,
that this is true has been demonstrated time and time again in the
hundreds of social scientific experiments revealing the features of the
situational character just described, as well as many others. 3 Social
scientists repeatedly and predictably manipulate the thoughts and
behaviors of subjects in ways the subjects do not appreciate, often by
taking advantage of one or another bias, motivation, or visceral
48. John P.J. Pinel et al., Hunger, Eating, and Ill Health, 55 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1105, 1111 (2000) (attributing self-regulation of eating to
environmental factors).
49. Blood sugar levels would become dangerously high if the body did not
lower its blood sugar levels before the influx began. See Broken Scales, supra
note 3, at 1681-84.
50. Id. at 1675.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NESBITr, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION:
PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 66 (1991).
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factor that the scientist is exploring.
5 4
Critical realism, having drawn on social science to establish this
realistic conception of human agency, at this point turns to some
highly probative principles of economics to make the prediction that
while lay people are dispositionists, and while legal theorists have
too often been dispositionist, market actors-i.e., corporations-will
discover the truth about who we are and what moves us.
Corporations will appreciate that we are situational characters
because they have an enormous incentive to know, and a tremendous
capacity to find out."5 The competitive pressures of the market will
compel profit-maximizing corporations to discover and exploit
methods of exercising unseen situational influence over consumer
behavior, in the same way that market forces compel firms to devise
and employ the most efficient forms of business organization.
5 6
Because the market will drive firms in this direction, rewarding with
profit firms that do it and rendering bankrupt those that do not,
corporations may come to engage in manipulative situational
influence vis-i-vis consumers even without any human beings within
the corporation consciously desiring to do so. Thus, in the context
under scrutiny here, competitive pressures will force firms selling
junk food to discover and exploit ways of influencing junk-food
consumption, even where individual corporations claim not to, or
even where all corporate officers promise to espouse social
responsibility in their business practices. Firms that fail to exploit
opportunities for unseen situational influence over consumers will
die out, those that even happen to stumble mistakenly on
mechanisms of situational influence will thrive. Hanson and I call
this process "power economics."
57
54. See generally Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra
note 21 (emphasizing throughout that nearly every study reviewed suggests
human vulnerability to unseen situational manipulation).
55. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 21, at 219-23.
56. See id. at218.
57. See id. at 193-201 (discussing power economics). Below I will argue
that the problem presented by power economics militates in favor of a near
total ban on junk-food advertising, rather than a ban on specific modes or
methods of advertising. See infra Part II.D. This is because power economics
predicts that market forces will compel corporations to engage in manipulative
practices even where the mechanics of such practices are not consciously
understood or intentionally deployed by corporate managers. See infra Part
II.C.2.
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This approach thus predicts that corporations will strive to
exercise unseen situational influence over consumers. Certainly such
influence extends through the stimulation of consumption, as we
shall soon see that it has in the junk-food market. But critical realism
further predicts that one of the crucial ways that corporations will
exercise situational influence is by cultivating, promoting, and
entrenching dispositionism, to regulators, and to consumers
themselves. While corporations appreciate the fact that people are
situational characters, they have a great stake in widespread
dispositionism, because it is this outlook that places responsibility for
any bad outcomes associated with consumer behavior squarely on
consumers themselves, rather than on the situational influences that
may be driving that behavior. We call this process "deep capture."
58
Broken Scales was dedicated to elaborating these concepts and
testing these predictions in the specific context of the obesity
epidemic.5 9 We examined in some detail the ways in which the food
industry has powerfully shaped consumer behavior in this area, and
how the industry has evaded responsibility for having done so by
pursuing deep capture.60 The present Article will next first further
explore the nature of the obesity epidemic, specifically the
relationship between junk-food advertising and childhood obesity.
Thereafter, I proceed to the conceptual heart of the Article, which is
an analysis, from the critical realist perspective, of the constitutional
issues implicated in what I propose would be one very effective
regulatory response to the problem of childhood obesity-a
legislative ban on junk-food advertising to children.
6 1
58. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 21, at 202-30
(describing the "deep capture" hypothesis). "Deep capture" is an extension of
the concept of administrative "capture" in public-choice theory. Economists
have long appreciated that industry often succeeds in influencing ("capturing")
the administrative agencies charged with regulating industry conduct.
Conventional capture theory, however, has failed to recognize that there are
many more capture-worthy and capturable institutions that bear on corporate
profit, not the least of which is consumers' conceptions of the sources of their
own behavior. Id, For sources discussing conventional agency capture, see
David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative
State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 105 n. 37 (2000).
59. Broken Scales, supra note 3, at 1648-54.
60. Id. at 1689-1720.
61. See infra Part II.D.
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2. Childhood Obesity and Junk-Food Advertising
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 16
percent of U.S. children ages 6 to 19-around 9 million children-
suffer from obesity. 62 This is triple the rate of three decades ago, and
the trend shows no signs of slowing.63  The obesity epidemic is
bringing with it widespread human suffering-in the form of
diabetes, diseases of the heart, liver, and kidneys, depression, and
premature death, as well as an enormous social cost in terms of
public healthcare expenditures dedicated to dealing with these
conditions.
64
There are, no doubt, many contributing factors to the childhood
obesity epidemic. To understand what part corporate behavior plays
in it, we must understand that market forces compel successful firms
in the junk-food industry to exploit any situational advantage they
can to influence children to consume their products.65  One very
powerful method of situational influence that firms have at their
disposal is advertising. 66 The most widespread advertising method is
the use of broadcast promotions on television for junk-food
products.67  Billboard and print advertising in newspa ers and
magazines are other familiar and widespread methods. More
recently, market: pressures have led to the creation of innovative
forms of advertising, including in schools, on the Internet, through
62. Prevalence and Trends in Overweight Among US Children and
Adolescent, 1999-2000, 288 JAMA 1728, 1729 (2002). More than thirty
percent of the adult population in the United States-sixty million people-is
obese. Id.
63. Id.
64. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates the
direct medical costs of overweight and obesity at almost ninety-three billion
dollars per year, with about half of that being paid from public funds through
government health care programs. Broken Scales, supra note 3, at 1650-51.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58 (making this argument).
66. Of course, advertising is by no means the only mechanism by which the
junk food industry exercises situational influence. Other methods involve
making junk-food products ubiquitously available to consumers, a ubiquity
which shapes, and does not merely reflect, consumer preferences. See Broken
Scales, supra note 3, at 1691-99.
67. See id. at 1700-01.
68. See CMTY. ANTI-DRUG COAL. OF AMER. & CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB.
INTEREST, ALCOHOL ADVERTISING: ITS IMPACT ON COMMUNITIES, AND WHAT
COALITIONS CAN DO TO LESSEN THAT IMPACT, http://www.cspinet.org/
booze/AlcoholAdverstising.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
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cell phones, and through product placement and promotion directly
in the content of entertainment programming. 69  Social scientists
have been somewhat slow to study these innovative methods of
advertising, slower, anyway, than corporations have been.7" There
is, however, a formidable body of social science analyzing
conventional methods of advertising to children, in particular
television advertising.
71
Watching television has become "the dominant pastime of youth
throughout the industrialised world. 7 2 Most of the $12 billion per
year deployed by corporations in promoting junk food to children is
spent on television advertising. 73 Researchers estimate that children
in the United States see between twenty thousand to forty thousand
television commercials each year. 74  The vast majority of these
advertisements are for fast food, soft drinks, sugared cereal, and
candy.75 The consensus among researchers, and the revealed opinion
69. See generally BRIAN L. WILCOX ET AL., REPORT OF THE AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON ADVERTISING AND CHILDREN
(2004), http://www.apa.org/pi/cyf/advertisingandchildren.pdf (describing
various ways advertisers target children).
70. Id. at 9 ("Nearly all research on advertising to children involves studies
of television, leaving us with little empirical knowledge about other
commercial forms and contexts.").
71. Id. The question of what constitutes advertising "directed at children,"
as distinct from advertising "directed at adults," is an important-and, I argue,
vexing--question when it comes to the constitutional analysis of any ban that
purports to forbid junk-food advertising to children but not to adults. For
present purposes, however, the question may be held in abeyance and it will
serve to follow the path broken by social scientists who have simply focused
on the effects of advertising obviously directed at children. See, e.g., Krista
Kotz & Mary Story, Food Advertisements During Children's Saturday
Morning Television Programming: Are They Consistent with Dietary
Recommendations?, 94 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS'N 1296, 1296-1300 (1994)
(analyzing the content of food advertisements during television programming
aimed specifically at children).
72. David S. Ludwig & Steven L. Gortmaker, Programming Obesity in
Children, 364 LANCET 226 (2004) (collecting studies analyzing the
relationship between television advertising and obesity in children).
73. WILCOX ET AL., supra note 69, at 20.
74. Mary Story & Simone French, Food Advertising and Marketing
Directed at Children and Adolescents in the US., I INT'L J. OF BEHAV.
NUTRITION & PHYSICAL ACTIVITY 3 (2004). Children in low-income families
have a higher exposure to food advertising because they tend to spend more
time watching television than do their more affluent counterparts. Id.
75. E. Katherine Battle & Kelly D. Brownell, Confronting a Rising Tide of
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of profit-oriented market actors, is that television advertising
contributes substantially to the heavy consumption of junk food on
the part of children.
76
It is important to appreciate that television advertising
contributes to childhood obesity in multiple ways. Perhaps most
importantly, junk-food advertising alters children's diets by inducing
preferences for junk-food consumption.7 7 Additionally, junk-food
advertising contributes substantially to sedentary habits in children,
which contribute to weight gain.78  Advertising pays for the
programming that draws children to the couch and away from more
physically strenuous activity, so that they will be sitting more-or-less
still when the programming is interrupted with advertising. Thus,
television programs aimed at children are essentially advertisements
for advertisements. That is the sense, undoubtedly, in which
Eating Disorders and Obesity: Treatment vs. Prevention and Policy, 21
ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 755, 761 (1996).
76. See Ludwig & Gortmaker, supra note 72. Though far out of the
mainstream in this area, a few scholars have argued that food advertising has
no adverse effect on children, and possibly serves useful purposes, and
therefore should not be targeted for regulation in an effort to curb the obesity
epidemic among children. See Todd J. Zywicki et al., Obesity and Advertising
Policy 52 (George Mason Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Paper No. 3,
2004), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1002&context=-gmulwps.
77. See Dina L. G. Borzekowski & Thomas N. Robinson, The 30-Second
Effect: An Experiment Revealing the Impact of Television Commercials on
Food Preferences of Preschoolers, 101 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS'N 42, 42-46
(2001) (showing that exposure to a 30-second food advertisement during the
course of a TV program changed food preferences in preschool children); id. at
42 (finding that in the two weeks following watching particular television
advertising, 67% of Latino preschool subjects asked to be taken to the
particular restaurant or store shown in the commercials and 55% requested a
featured food or drink). Of course, children are often fed by their parents.
However, this has not stopped corporations from marketing junk food products
directly to children, as marketers have extensively studied the power of
advertising to induce children to "nag" their parents incessantly to feed them
the advertised junk food. See Broken Scales, supra note 3, at 1705-07.
Children's direct purchasing power has also increased substantially in recent
decades, such that children often purchase and consume junk food without
parental intervention. One study estimated that children fourteen years old and
younger are directly responsible for $24 billion in purchases annually, and
influence over $190 billion in family purchases annually. WILCOX ET AL.,
supra note 69, at 20-21.
78. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, POLL: LACK OF EXERCISE BLAMED FOR KID
OBESITY, available at http://msnbc.com/id/9812095/.
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children's programming is understood by the food industry.
79
Studies also show that children, like adults, often eat while watching
television, food that would likely not be consumed were they
engaged in some other activity.
80
Just how does exposure to junk-food advertising lead to the
consumption of junk food by children? The process is somewhat
opaque. What is clear, however, is that the process does not
resemble the stylized picture of a rational actor gathering and
responding to information about the availability and price of a good
for which the actor has a pre-existing preference. 8' The findings in
this area are much more consistent with a situational character-type
conception of agency and consumer behavior.8 2  As a recent
commission report of the American Psychological Association
summarized:
Commercials are highly effective at employing production
conventions, or formal features, to attract children's
attention, such as unique sound effects and auditory
changes, rapidly moving images, and audiovisual gimmicks
and special effects.
... [A]dvertising to children avoids any appeal to the
rational, emphasizing instead that ads are entertainment and
'enjoyable for their own sake,' as opposed to providing any
real consumer information. The most common persuasive
strategy employed in advertising to children is to associate
the product with fun and happiness, rather than to provide
any factual product-related information. For example, a
commercial featuring Ronald McDonald dancing, singing,
and smiling in McDonald's restaurants without any mention
of the actual food products available reflects a
fun/happiness theme. This strategy is also found frequently
79. Thus, the junk-food industry's claim that it is sedentary lifestyles, rather
than food consumption habits, that is responsible for childhood obesity would
not, even if it were true, absolve the industry of responsibility for the epidemic.
See Broken Scales, supra note 3 at 1727-68 (reviewing industry arguments).
80. See Ludwig & Gortmaker, supra note 72.
81. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 21, at 154-60
(reviewing presumptions underlying conventional conceptions of human
behavior, with particular reference to the rational actor model in law and
economics).
82. See id. at 154-60, 265.
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with cereal ads, which often include spokes-characters (e.g.,
Tony the Tiger, Cap'n Crunch) to help children identify the
product. In contrast, most commercials fail to mention even
the major grain used in each cereal .... 83
Some researchers have argued that junk-food advertising makes
use of deeply ingrained information-transmitting cues through which
human young have, from time immemorial, learned what foods are
beneficial to eat, and which are to be avoided: "[T]he themes
emphasized in television advertisements for foods appear to be
providing information that once served as a signal of nutritional
value. ' 84 Such cues, which have been shown to be influential in the
development of eating habits in other mammals, involve themes such
as food being fought over, or the consumption of a food item being
accompanied by exaggerated visible signs of enjoyment, as well as
of health and vitality generally.8 5 When children respond to such
cues and consume the advertised foods, they encounter foods that are
filled with salt, sugar, and fat, precisely the kinds of highly caloric
foods our evolutionarily betrothed eating systems are oriented
towards consuming in large amounts when they are available.
8 6
Unfortunately, such foods, which were available only intermittently
in the natural conditions under which our eating systems evolved, are
today made ubiquitously available to children by the food industry,
not just in grocery stores, but in schools, shopping centers, gasoline
stations, and any other place corporations can reach.
8 7
Much of the research in this area has focused on tracking
children's own conscious understanding of the advertisements they
see. Such studies have established that "young children have little
understanding of the persuasive intent of advertising."8 1 Children
begin to understand advertising intent around the age of seven or
eight. Preteens, this research suggests, "possess the cognitive ability
83. WILCOX ET AL., supra note 69, at 23-24 (citation omitted).
84. Trenton G. Smith, The McDonald's Equilibrium: Advertising, Empty
Calories, and the Endogenous Determination of Dietary Preferences, 23 SOC.
CHOICE & WELFARE 383, 404 (2004).
85. See id.
86. See id. at 405-06.
87. See Broken Scales, supra note 3 at 1675-89 (describing "The Interior
Situation of the Human Eating System," with special reference to evolutionary
biology).
88. Story & French, supra note 74, at 3.
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to process advertisements but do not necessarily do so."89 These
findings, to be sure, provide important evidence of the unseen
influence of junk-food advertising on children. But the importance
of such findings to the overall analytic project underway in this
article should not be overstated. Even though adults may recognize
the persuasive intent of advertisements, that does not mean that the
advertisements do not influence adults in ways they do not
appreciate. Indeed, advertising's powerful grip on adults is bolstered
by the irony that most adults believe advertising probably
manipulates other consumers, but not themselves.90 While it is cause
for concern that children do not recognize the persuasive intent of
junk-food advertising, the recognition of such intent is hardly
conclusive with respect to the unseen power of advertising to
manipulate consumer behavior.
C. The Inadequacy of the Present Regulatory Framework
In light of the foregoing, it may come as a surprise to learn that
junk-food advertising, even junk-food advertising directed at
children, is almost entirely unregulated. The following sections will
describe important aspects of the regulations that do exist, with
emphasis given to the regime established by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), the principle federal agency concerned with
regulating advertising. Many state-based regulatory efforts are
modeled on the FTC's approach, which is itself built on a general
framework derived from familiar common law principles.91 I will
argue that the FTC-type approach is grossly inadequate to the task of
soundly regulating junk-food advertising, in large measure because
of the strong dispositionist presumptions that the framework
employs. I explore this argument through an examination of the
legal concept of "puffery," and the central part that doctrines such as
"puffery" play in insulating the pernicious effects of junk-food
advertising from the reach of extant statutory and common law
regulation.
89. Id.
90. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 21, at
228.
91. See infra text accompanying notes 122-133.
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1. The Basic FTC Framework
Established in 1914 as a centerpiece of the Roosevelt
administration's antitrust legislation, the FTC is one of the oldest
administrative agencies of the federal government.92 The agency's
enabling legislation gave it the power to prohibit "unfair methods of
competition,"93 but initially contained no specific reference to
protecting consumers against deceptive trade practices. 94 Agency
administrators, however, soon came to see consumer deception as an
important form of unfair competition. A company that deceives
customers, the FTC reasoned, competed unfairly against a competitor
that does not.95 With the courts divided over whether consumer
deception was within the ambit of the agency's regulatory power,
Congress in 1938 stepped in and formally granted the FTC the power
to prohibit "deceptive acts or practices." 96  The same legislation
specifically empowered the FTC to regulate food advertising.
97
Despite its mandate officially expanding throughout the 1940s
and 1950s, the agency, by the end of the 1960s, came under
withering criticism from both consumer groups and legal scholars as
being inept, polluted by patronage, and captured by industry
influence. 98  In the 1970s the agency enjoyed a brief period of
resurgence, in part as a result of internal reforms adopted in response
92. MARY DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW § 8:2
(2004).
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931); FTC v. Winsted
Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307
(7th Cir. 1919).
95. PRIDGEN, supra note 92, at § 8:2.
96. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a), Pub. L. No. 447, 52 Stat. 111
(1938). For a detailed legislative history of the Wheeler-Lea Amendment, see
EARL KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 4807-46 (Chelsea House Publishers 1982)
(1978).
97. KINTNER, supra note 96, at 4812. The FTC regulates food advertising,
while the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for food
labeling. See Working Agreement Between the FTC and FDA, 3 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 9851 (1971).
98. See, e.g., EDWARD F. Cox ET AL., "THE NADER REPORT" ON THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969) (examining the failures of the FTC in
their management of resources and funds); Richard Posner, The Federal Trade
Commission, 37 U. Clu. L. REv. 47 (1969).
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to the criticism it had sustained in the preceding decade. 99 At
perhaps the zenith of this surge, the FTC in the late 1970s undertook
to ban advertising directed at children altogether. 1
00
The FTC staff report that proposed such a ban drew heavily on
social scientific study of the influence of advertising on the
consumption behavior of children, some of which was summarized
above.' 0' The report argued that the cognitive immaturity of children
made advertising'directed at them inherently deceptive:
[C]hildren are at the opposite pole, psychologically,
intellectually and economically, from the traditionally
assumed 'rational consumer' for whom advertising provides
a service, by offering him or her information relevant to
logical market behavior. Children too young to understand
even the concept of a market in which products compete are
also too young to understand that a decision to consume any
product may imply a decision not to consumer some other
product, or to forgo some other benefit. The classical
justification for a free market, and for the advertising that
goes with it, assumes at least a rough balance of
information, sophistication and power between buyer and
seller.... [I]t is ludicrous to suggest that any such balance
exists between an advertiser who is willing to spend many
thousands of dollars for a single 30-second spot, and a child
who is incapable of understanding that the spot has a selling
intent, and instead trustingly believes that the spot merely
provides advice about one of the good things in life.
10 2
Intense Congressional lobbying by the food industry succeeded
in scuttling the FTC proposal.' 3 Congress, which has a history of
withholding funds from the FTC when it disapproves of the agency's
99. See PRIDGEN, supra note 92, § 8:2.
100. See ELLIS M. RATNER ET AL., FTC STAFF REPORT ON TELEVISION
ADVERTISING TO CILDREN 10-11 (1978). The report itself is based on more
than 60,000 pages of testimony on the issue of commercial advertising to
children. Id.
101. See id.; see also supra Part II.D.
102. RATNER ET AL., supra note 100, at 28-29. Interestingly, childhood
obesity was not yet a major problem in the 1970s; the major health problem
that the FTC identified in connection with junk-food advertising to children
was tooth decay. See id. at 119-41.
103. See Story & French, supra note 74, at 12-13.
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actions, refused the FTC funds to so much as hold a hearing on its
proposal. 10 4 And just in case the FTC failed to get the message,
Congress passed the FTC Improvements Act of 1980, which
"specifically prohibited any further action to adopt the proposed
children's advertising rules,"105 and imposed on the agency "a three-
year moratorium on the promulgation of rules against unfair
advertising."' 10 6  Perhaps even more importantly, Congress also
forbade the FTC from imposing industry-wide regulations regarding
deceptive advertising practices in 1980, requiring the agency instead
to make determinations on a case-by-case basis.107 This prohibition
lasted until legislation re-authorizing the FTC as a federal agency
removed the restriction in 1993.108 In 1990, Congress passed the
Children's Television Act, 10 9 which required the FTC to promulgate
regulations that !'limit[ed] the amount of commercial time during
children's programming to 10.5 [minutes per hour] on weekends and
12 [minutes per hour] on weekdays."110 These restrictions remain in
place. "'
The FTC has today adopted a "partnership" model of regulating
advertising to children, purporting to work co-operatively with
industry to advance its mission of preventing deceptive advertising.
In July of 2005, responding to the growing visibility of the childhood
104. The FTC enabling legislation formerly contained a provision allowing
Congress to veto any regulatory act with which it disagreed; however, the
United States Supreme Court deemed the provision unconstitutional. See
Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S.
1216 (1983). See generally INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding
legislative vetos unconstitutional on separation-of-powers grounds).
105. Story & French, supra note 74, at 13.
106. PRIDGEN, supra note 92, § 8:2, see also 15 U.S.C. § 57a-1 (1982)
(providing Congress with final review of rules promulgated by the FTC). The
congressional response to the proposed regulations was no doubt one part
capture and one part deep capture. Cf Broken Scales, supra note 3, at 1724-
26 (examining the'conjunction of capture and deep capture in legislative
proposals to halt tort suits against the fast food industry for consumer harms).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 57(a)(i).
108. See Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-312, 108 Stat. 1691, 1695.
109. Children's Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(a), 303(b), 394 (2000)).
110. Story & French, supra note 74, at 12 tbl.6.
111. See id.
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obesity epidemic;" 2 the FTC held a "public workshop" on the issue
in Washington, D.C. Reflecting its partnership approach, the agency
titled the workshop "Marketing, Self-Regulation, and Childhood
Obesity."'1 13 The workshop served to highlight the FTC's present
regulatory appetite, or lack thereof, for regulating junk-food
advertising. The emphasis of the workshop was "on industry self-
regulatory efforts, and.., recent initiatives by individual companies
to respond to childhood obesity through changes in their products or
their marketing efforts." 1 14  Prior to the workshop, FTC Chair
Deborah Platt Majoras released remarks stating: "I want to be clear
that, from the FTC's perspective, this is not the first step toward new
government regulations to ban or restrict children's food advertising
and marketing. The FTC tried that approach in the 1970s, and it
failed for good reasons.""l
5
2. The Problem with the Present Regulatory Approach
Because Congress prohibited the FTC from developing a general
ban on advertising to children, 6 . the regulation of such advertising
has been left to the FTC's general power to regulate deceptive
advertising on a case-by-case basis. Although the case-by-case
review method 'is vulnerable to criticism from a number of
programmatic and theoretical perspectives, I will focus here on the
profound inadequacy of the standard that the FTC employs in cases
where it does act.
112. In the last several years, public health advocates, scholars, filmmakers,
and the media have paid increasing attention to the obesity crisis. See Broken
Scales, supra note 3, at 1746-56 (discussing the movie "Supersize Me" and
media response to it).
113. Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Obesity Liability Conference 8 (May
11, 2005) (on file with author). The workshop was co-sponsored by the
Department of Health and Human Services. Id.
114. Majoras, supra note 113, at 8.
115. Id. Majoras continued:
I would like to emphasize the potential for advertising to be a positive
force in this area. I am sure that no one in this room doubts the power
of advertising to shape consumer demand and choices. Similarly, the
FTC is a big believer in advertising as a promoter of competition in
our free market society.
Id.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 104-111.
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In response to congressional inquiry, the FTC in 1983 produced
a "Policy Statement on Deception" (hereinafter, the "Deception
Statement"), which purported to articulate the industry's views on the
concept of deception so as "to provide a concrete indication of the
manner in which the Commission [would] enforce its deception
mandate." 117 The Deception Statement brought together standards
developed during the FTC's decades long enforcement record, and
the statement has, since 1983, served as the central analytic
guidepost in subsequent agency actions. 118  According to the
Deception Statement, for an advertisement, or any trade practice, to
be "deceptive" within the meaning of Section 5 of the FTC Act,
"there must be a representation, omission or practice that is likely to
mislead the consumer."' 1 9 Importantly, a misleading statement only
constitutes deception if it is "material,"'121 that is, if it is "likely to
affect the consumer's conduct or decision with regard to a product or
service.' 21 Reflecting the common law standards on which it is
based, the Deception Statement purports to modulate its standard
based on the intended target of an advertisement: "When
representations or sales practices are targeted to a specific audience,
such as children, the elderly, or the terminally ill, the Commission
determines the effect of the practice on a reasonable member of that
group." 1
22
The fundamental inadequacy of the FTC approach, and similar
state law approaches to advertising regulation, is their misguided
adherence to common law, and common sense, notions of what is
"likely to affect consumer[] conduct."'123  To appreciate how,
consider the operation of a central legal concept in both FTC and
common law jurisprudence: the doctrine of "puffery."
117. Letter from James C. Miller, III, Chairman of the FTC, to John D.
Dingell, Chairman of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce, U.S. House of
Representatives (Oct. 14, 1983), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
policystmt/ad-decept.htm.
118. The 1993 FTC reauthorization act gave legislative imprimatur to the
view of deception expressed in the Letter from James C. Miller, III., to John D.
Dingell, supra note .118, See PRIDGEN, supra note 92, at § 8:2.






"Puffery" refers to a nebulous but broad category of hyperbole
and bluster that in the eyes of the law does not constitute false or
misleading advertising because "no reasonable consumer relies upon
it."' 24 For example, advertising stating that a pasta manufacturer's
product was "America's Favorite Pasta," was un-actionable puffery,
despite the fact that there was no evidence that the pasta was, in fact,
America's favorite.125 By operation of the doctrine, a pizza company
promoting its product as comprising "Better Ingredients. Better
Pizza," even when compared to other pizza brands, could not be
made to answer for a cause of action based in consumer deception.
26
A video game company promoting its product as "the most advanced
home-gaming system in the universe," even though other systems
were more advanced, could not be made to answer for a claim based
on misleading consumers. 127  More generally, advertising which
associates a particular product with exaggerated excitement, health
and vitality, fun, and happiness is considered puffery, and therefore
irrelevant to consumer deception concerns.1 28 A classic explanation
of the doctrine comes, as usual, from Judge Learned Hand:
There are some kinds of talk which no sensible man takes
seriously, and if he does he suffers from his credulity. If we
124. Rodney A. Smolla, Free the Fortune 500! The Debate over Corporate
Speech and the First Amendment, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1277, 1279 n.12.
(2004) (defining puffery).
125. Am. Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d 387, 391-92
(8th Cir. 2004).
126. Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John's Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 498-99 (5th Cir.
2000).
127. Atari Corp. v. 3DO Co., No. C 94-20298 RMW (EAI), 1994 WL
723601 (N.D. Cal., May 16 1994).
128. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc., 2005 WL 280330
(Cal. Super. Ct. 2005) ("[P]laintiffs do not identify any advertising that is
misleading or false. Instead the plaintiffs focus on puffery or on qualities that
are not affirmations of fact such as the fun, sexiness, popularity, social
acceptance, athleticism, etc. that drinking alcohol can bring. This is not
actionable .... ."). Professor Ivan L. Preston identifies several different
categories of advertising claims that are considered un-actionable as a matter
of law, including "puffery," "obviously false claims," and "lifestyle claims,"
which he refers to collectively as "loophole claims." See Ivan L. Preston,
Puffery and Other '"Loophole" Claims: How the Law's 'Don't Ask, Don't tell'
Policy Condones Fraudulent Falsity in Advertising, 18 J.L. & COM. 49, 54-74
(1998). I make use of Preston's excellent analysis infra text accompanying
notes 133-141, but I maintain the convention of referring broadly to all such
"loophole claims" as "puffery."
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were all scrupulously honest, it would not be so; but, as it
is, neither party usually believes what the seller says about
his own opinions, and each knows it. 
129
The FTC embraces the puffery doctrine:
Certain practices... are unlikely to deceive consumers
acting reasonably. Thus, the Commission generally will not
bring advertising cases based on subjective claims (taste,
feel, appearance, smell) or on correctly stated opinion
claims if consumers understand the source and limitations
of the opinion....
The Commission generally will not pursue cases involving
obviously exaggerated or puffing representations, i.e., those that the
ordinary consumers do not take seriously. 130  While both the FTC
and the common law purport to evaluate the deceptiveness of
advertising from the perspective of its target audience, 13 the doctrine
of puffery appears to be no less expansively applied to advertising
directed at children as it is to advertising generally.13
2
Despite its familiarity and force, the doctrine of puffery, is
shabbily under-theorized. Commentators have found the doctrine to
be highly problematic, both analytically and empirically. 133 The idea
that statements constituting puffery do not influence consumer
behavior or decision-making is given the lie by the fact that a
129. Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons Mfg. Co., 248 F. 853, 856 (2d Cir.
1918); see also Cook, Perkiss & Liehe Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., Inc.,
911 F.2d 242, 246 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Puffing has been described by most courts
as involving outrageous statements, not making specific claims, that are so
exaggerated as to preclude reliance by consumers.").
130. Letter from James C. Miller, III., to John D. Dingell, supra note 117.
131. See id.
132. See, e.g., Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 530
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("In any case, if plaintiffs are only concerned about the
appellation 'Mightier Kids Meal,' such [a] name is seemingly mere puffery,
rather than any claim that children who eat a 'Mightier Kids Meal' will
become mightier.").
133. Jean W. Bums, Confused Jurisprudence: False Advertising Under the
Lanham Act, 79 B.U. L. REv. 807, 835, 846-73 (1999) (finding courts
inconsistently define "puffery"); Richard J. Leighton, Materiality and Puffing
in Lanham Act False Advertising Cases: The Proofs, Presumptions, and
Pretexts, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 585 (2004) (examining the puffery doctrine).
See generally Preston, supra note 128 (analyzing the court's historical
treatment of puffery and its subsequent evolution into loophole claims allowed
by the FTC).
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substantial proportion of contemporary advertising consists of
nothing but puffery. If puffery were as inconsequential as the
puffery doctrine holds it to be, then profit-maximizing corporations
would not engage in it-firms that wasted money on it would be
quickly subsumed by those that did not. And, sure enough, empirical
evidence reveals that advertising conventionally categorized as
"puffery" does indeed influence the behavior of ordinary consumers,
epigrammatic protestations to the contrary by Judge Hand
notwithstanding.1
34
Ivan L. Preston has studied the FTC's advertising review process
extensively and argues that uncritical acceptance of the puffery
doctrine has seriously undermined the agency's effectiveness:
[FTC practice] does not fully reflect the FTC's policy
statements on puffery, which define the concept as claims
consumers see as meaningless, thus impliedly requiring
determination of the latter.... Staff practice, however,
does not involve investigation into consumer response;
rather, it appears to involve only examination of the words,
followed by decisions that claims having semantic forms
previously ruled to be puffery, are puffery. If the claim is
puffery semantically and is unaccompanied by questionable
fact claims, it is virtually assumed automatically at the
investigation stage to be meaningless and, thus, to be
puffery in fact.., leading to the conclusion again and again
that consumers understand these claims as meaningless and
so cannot be deceived.
35
From the critical realist perspective, one would anticipate that
consumers would be susceptible to influence through advertising
practices that dispositionist presumptions would lead us to consider
innocuous, but which market practices suggest is efficacious. And
this is in fact what social scientific study of "mere puffery" has
found. Indeed, "no behavioral studies have reported the finding,
assumed by the law, that consumers typically see puffery and other
loophole claims as meaningless."'136  One empirical study of
134. See Preston, supra note 128.
135. Id. at 62.
136. Id. at 82-83; see also Bruce G. Vanden Bergh & Leonard N. Reid,
Effects of Product Puffery on Response to Print Advertisements, 1980
CURRENT ISSUES & RES. ADVERTISING, 123; Bruce G. Vanden Bergh &
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consumer thinking, for example,
surveyed a sample of citizens on whether they felt various
advertising claims were "completely true," "partly true," or
"not true at all." The puffery claims among them were rated
as follows: "State Farm is all you need to know about life
insurance" (22 percent said completely true, 36 percent said
partly true); "The world's most experienced airline" (Pan
Am) (23 percent and 47 percent respectively); "Ford has a
better idea" (26 percent and 42 percent); "You can trust
your car to the man who wears the star" (Texaco) (21
percent and 47 percent);"It's the real thing" (Coca-Cola) (35
percent and 29 percent); "Perfect rice everytime" (Minute
Rice) (43 percent and 30 percent) ... Alcoa's claim,
"Today, aluminum is something else," [was] appraised as
completely true by 47 percent and partly true by 36
percent. 137
Each of these statements is posed in a form that would be
captured by the puffery doctrine. As Preston concluded, "[h]ad
people responded as the law assumes, they would all have answered
'not true at all." ' 138 Note that the study quoted above was conducted
not by academics, but by advertising experts seeking to understand
what was and was not working in the advertising they produced.
139
Through such inquiry, market actors have developed a much clearer
understanding of what influences consumers than the law does,
which continues to view "mere puffery" through the lens of intuition
and common sense. 140
Leonard N. Reid, Puffery and Magazine Ad Readership, 44 J. MARKETING 78
(1980) (finding consumers do not necessarily consider puffery meaningless);
Morris B. Holbrook, Beyond Attitude Structure: Toward the Informational
Determinants of Attitude, 15 J. MARKETING RES. 545 (1978); Jerry C. Olson &
Philip A. Dover, Cognitive Effects of Deceptive Advertising, 15 J. MARKETING
RES. 29 (1978); Herbert J. Rotfeld & Kim B. Rotzoll, Is Advertising Puffery
Believed?, 9 J. ADVERTISING 16, 18 (1980).
137. Preston, supra note 128, at 80-81 (citing Consumer Confidence-Signs
of an Upturn, BRUSKIN REPORT (R.H. Bruskin Associates, New Brunswick,
N.J.), May 1971, at 2).
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. Another interesting study suggests that "puffery" may even
meaningfully influence consumer behavior where the "meaningless" nature of
the puffery in a given advertisement is highlighted. Id. at 83. After surveyed
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The enormous spending on "puffery" would be an enormous
waste of corporate resources if these types of advertisements were as
meaningless as the law presumes. Nevertheless, when challenged,
corporations are quick to raise the puffery defense in their motions
and briefs. Because of the power of the puffery doctrine to repel
scrutiny of the real power of much advertising, it is difficult to find
evidence beyond corporate practice alone evidencing corporate
understanding of just how manipulative puffing can be over
consumer behavior. However, corporate submissions to the FTC's
recent workshop on the childhood obesity epidemic ironically
provides revealing evidence of the fact that corporations are capable,
and know they are capable, of influencing consumption through
puffing. 141
General Mills, Inc., in a written submission to the workshop,
endeavored to explain that it has responded responsibly to the
childhood obesity epidemic, in part, by marketing healthier foods to
children (thus, General Mills concluded, no further regulation by the
FTC was necessary). 142  For present purposes, what is important
about General Mill's argument is its admission concerning the power
of puffing. In asection titled "Yogurt consumption by kids-how
General Mills accelerated kid adoption of a healthful product by
marketing the concept of fun (and not particular health benefits)
consumers were informed that certain advertised product attributes were
meaningless-for example, that "flaked crystals" were irrelevant to the brew
quality of instant coffee-consumer preferences nevertheless continued to be
shaped favorably by the presence of such irrelevant information. Id. That is,
consumers who were first exposed to advertisements promoting a coffee
product having "flaked crystals" and were then told that "flaked crystals" are
irrelevant to the quality of coffee, still had a greater preference for the coffee
than did consumers who were exposed to ads that did not portray the coffee as
having "flaked crystals" at all. Id. Information that was meaningless,
therefore, influenced consumer behavior even after they were alerted to its
meaninglessness. Id. The FTC and most common law courts, however, would
begin and end with the legal conclusion that such meaningless statements had
no effect on consumer behavior. See id. at 84.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 113-115(discussing FTC
chairperson's comments in conjunction with the workshop).
142. Letter from Kendall J. Powell, Executive Vice President and Chief
Operating Officer, General Mills, to Donald S. Clark, Sec'y, Fed. Trade
Comm'n, General Mills Submission to FTC Obesity Conference (June 8,
2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/FoodMarketingtoKids/
516960-00028.pdf.
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directly to kids, '143 General Mills wrote:
Not too many years ago, American kids did not eat much
yogurt. General Mills set out to change that-not by
directly telling kids that eating yogurt would be better for
them than other common snack foods (like cookies and
candy)... but by making yogurt fun and appealing.
Among other important initiatives to encourage this, we
introduced Go-Gurt (a squeezable tube of yogurt suitable
for snacking on the go) and Trix yogurt (a conventional cup
yogurt branded in an appealing way), and supported these
products with appealing advertising emphasizing an
association between fun and yogurt. Adoption of these
products by kids in response to the marketing has been
impressive. In a 2005 survey of kids who consume yogurt,
76% said they like Go-Gurt and 74% said they like Trix, on
par with the liking scores of longstanding and dominant
products like Popsicles (77%) and Oreos (74%)....
Thus, effective marketing of these kid-oriented yogurt
products has essentially created a product category that did
not formerly exist, encouraging kids to more often choose
nutrient-dense yogurt as a healthful snack, providing kids
with calcium and protein without much sodium or fat. 144
General Mills is here trumpeting the ease with which it was able
to induce children's consumption of yogurt by advertising methods
that are, in consumer protection doctrine, non-influential as a matter
of law. Because it can exercise this power, General Mills argues,
any expansion of the FTC's regulation of junk-food advertising to
children is unnecessary. Surely the opposite conclusion is more
logical-namely that puffery is powerful, and that the conventional
regulatory framework, which does not regulate it, is inadequate.
General Mills has clearly engaged in extensive empirical study
of how to puff effectively. The statistics cited above are referenced
by a footnote to a study called the "General Mills Attitude and Usage
Study, February, 2003,"'14 1 which indicates that General Mills is
engaging in precisely the kind of social scientific study that has
143. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
144. Id. at3-4.
145. Id. at 3 n.5. The underlying study is not publicly available.
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among academic social scientists, though typically not legal scholars
or jurists, revealed the power of puffing. Undoubtedly General Mills
uses the same advertising tactics to promote foods that are far less
healthy than yogurt, such as its "Lucky Charms" cereals. The "fun
and appealing" antics of "Lucky the Leprechaun" no doubt influence
consumer behavior in much the same way that General Mills's
promotion of "Go-gurt" does, that is, by associating the product with
"fun" and "magic," matters that are attractive to children. 146 Yet the
connection between the "fun" and the product is dismissed as un-
actionable "puffery" in the eyes of the law. 1
47
"Puffery" is a legal doctrine that rests on a demonstrably false
conception of human thinking and decision-making. It is
dispositionist dogma, steeped in intuition and devoid of any social
scientific justification. Far from being a quaint or marginal doctrine,
puffery reflects an abiding ignorance, at the heart of contemporary
consumer protection law, of unconscious psychological processes,
and non-obvious influences on human behavior. What the law does
not appreciate, and what it must grapple with for an effective remedy
to the problem of junk-food advertising to children to be fashioned,
is that advertising influences consumers in ways that common
sense-both of the consumer and the regulator-is not likely to
appreciate. Junk-food advertising, ubiquitously deployed by profit-
seeking corporations, associating fun, magic, health and vitality with
junk-food consumption, for example, may mislead people with
respect to their perception and conception of the health consequences
of frequent junk-food consumption, in ways common sense fails to
see. 148 Many advertising methods and themes used to sell junk food,
146. See General Mills, Home Page, http://www.generalmills.com/corporate/
index.aspx (last visited July 22, 2005); Lucky Charms Magical Realm,
http://www.luckycharmsfun.millsberry.com/ (last visited July 22, 2005).
147. Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 656 N.E.2d 170, 183 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(describing representations of a "funmobile," with "fun written all over it" as
non-actionable puffery), overruled on other grounds by Connick v. Suzuki
Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584 (Ill. 1996).
148. The manipulation of consumer risk perception is just one way that
junk-food advertising can mislead consumers. As discussed earlier, some
researchers argue that junk-food advertising exploits signaling cues that have
guided human eating patterns-and those of our fellow mammals-for many
thousands of years, long before the emergence of civilization. See supra text
accompanying notes 54-60. Junk food advertising that deploys these cues
may give shape to eating habits that are debilitating, by misleading ancient
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that are viewed as unproblematic through the traditional normative
lens, may actually be very problematic.14
D. A Proposal to Ban Junk-Food Advertising to Children
In light of the foregoing, it seems that a fairly dramatic overhaul
of the present regulatory approach may be needed to stem the tide of
the childhood obesity epidemic. I propose that one innovative
response to the problem would be to implement a near total ban on
junk-food advertising to children. 150
One approach to such a ban would be to target only junk-food
advertising directed solely at children, or methods that appeal solely
to children, and exempt advertising to adults. Such a ban, however,
would only capture a very narrow category of advertising, if any at
all. Adults are nearly always present in communicative venues
where children are present, and communicative occasions where only
adults are allowed are very limited. Thus, any effective effort to
insulate children from junk-food advertising would necessarily
effectuate a substantial limitation on the advertising of junk food to
adults. A ban on'junk-food advertising to children must therefore be
conceived of, programmatically and analytically, as a near total ban
on junk-food advertising to adults, as well as to children. As will be
cues oriented towards signaling eating habits that would aid human
thriving.
149. Calling something "misleading" is ultimately a.legal conclusion, just as
assigning "causation" is, in the end, a legal conclusion. Legal economists, for
example, were interested in observing-and imposing-efficiency in legal
rules, and so for them "causation" in, say, a torts context would be located
where necessary to make the least cost avoider of harm take the appropriate
precautions. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Responsibility, Causation, and the
Harm-Benefit Line in Takings Jurisprudence, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REv 433,
504-05 (1995). The critical realist also attempts to locate-and install-her
legal theoretic preoccupations in actual and proposed law. Pre-occupied with
the analytic problem of unseen situational influence and manipulation, the
critical realist addresses these inquiries to the legal conception of "misleading"
speech, and calls misleading those unseen influences, particularly where they
operate to people's obvious detriment.
150. For other innovative approaches to regulating junk-food advertising, see
Valere Byrd Fulwider, Future Benefits? Tax Policy, Advertising, and the
Epidemic of Obesity in Children, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 217
(2003) (proposing changes to the tax treatment of advertising campaigns
directed at children); see also Mona L. Hymel, Consumerism, Advertising, and
the Role of Tax Policy, 20. VA. TAX REv. 348 (2000) (analyzing the influence
of tax policy on advertising practices and proposing reforms).
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discussed infra, that is, in any event, how the Supreme Court would
likely approach its review of such a ban.'
5 '
A near total ban is necessary, I assert, because the case-by-case
adjudication of false or misleading advertising in which the FTC,
state agencies, and common law courts are presently involved, is
hopelessly inadequate to the enormity of the problem. The case-by-
case method, institutionally, can never keep track of every adver-
tisement that is potentially misleading to consumers. Neither can
consumers themselves keep track of, and bring complaint against, the
avalanche of misleading junk-food advertising they confront on
television, radio, billboards, print periodicals, the Internet, or as
product placements within entertainment programming, music, video
games, and even live theater.1
5 2
Nor would it suffice to ban in piecemeal fashion specific types
or methods of advertising, such as the use of cartoon characters in
the selling of junk food. Such limitations would no doubt be
helpful-and my argument for the constitutionality of a near total
ban could certainly be applied to resolve constitutional appre-
hensions about such regulation. 153 But the problem with such an
151. In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 565 (2001), for
example, the Court found that limitations on billboard advertising of tobacco
products "to children" impinged substantially on the advertising of such
products to adults, and thus analyzed the ban in terms of its impact on the First
Amendment interests of adults. See infra text accompanying notes 232-239
discussing this aspect of Lorillard). Certainly there are ways of conceiving of
a narrow ban that might not substantially infringe on the promotion of junk
food to adults, such as banning junk-food advertising in television
programming which has an audience comprised overwhelmingly, or
substantially, of children-while allowing junk-food advertising in all other
television programming. Such a ban would perhaps be shown greater
deference as far as constitutional standards are concerned, see infra text
accompanying notes 234-236, but programmatically, in light of the ubiquity of
junk-food advertising in our society in so many places frequented by both
children and adults, such a ban would undoubtedly be far less effective than
the near total ban that I propose and analyze here.
152. See Joe Mandese, Paid Product Placement Surges in Magazines,
Newspapers, Other Media, MEDIA DAILY NEWS, July 26, 2005,
http://publications.mediapost.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=Articles.showArticle
HomePage&art-aid=32440.
153. See infra Part III. But see Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and
the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 589, 627-28 (1996) (arguing that a ban
on the use of cartoon characters such as "Joe Camel" in tobacco advertising
would be incompatible with the First Amendment).
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approach is that marketing departments of profit-driven corporations
will always stride several steps ahead of such piecemeal regulatory
practice, as market forces compel the most capable corporations
continually to discover mechanisms of misleading advertising that
have yet to be discerned by the government. There are numerous
ways for marketers to manipulate children's consumption behavior,
and their thinking about their behavior, in unseen ways. Indeed,
market forces will drive corporations to discover and exploit such
methods even where corporate managers have not consciously
endeavored to do so, as the discussion of puffery demonstrated. 1
54
Finally, a federal, legislative ban on junk-food advertising
obviates the need to tangle with thorny common law issues such as
"proximate cause," which would have to be satisfied were a remedy
to this problem sought through innovative causes of action styled in
tort. It is not suggested or proved here that junk-food advertising is
the sole "cause" of childhood obesity-but no such proof is needed
to justify the regulation of junk-food advertising, the perniciouis
effect of which is clear.1
55
Thus, I propose a near total ban on junk-food advertising, which
I call the "tombstone blues."' 56 The basic features of this proposal
are discussed in greater detail in Part III.B.3, following an
explanation of the constitutional standard that any such ban must
satisfy. In short, I envision a regulatory regime in which junk-food
154. See supra Part II.C.2.
155. Piecemeal litigation incorporating the insights described here, and
elsewhere, may nevertheless be possible, but the development of such an
approach is already being forestalled by legislative efforts at the state and
federal levels to insulate food companies from lawsuits in connection with the
obesity epidemic. See Broken Scales, supra note 3, at 1772-74 (discussing
federal legislative proposals to put an end to obesity-related lawsuits against
fast food companiep, including the Commonsense Consumption Act and the
Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act); see also Forrest Lee
Andrews, Small Bites: Obesity Lawsuits Prepare to Take on the Fast Food
Industry, 15 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 153 (2004) (reviewing the limited progress
of obesity related lawsuits).
156. I use the term "tombstone" in order to connect my proposal to the
"tombstone" advertising regime employed in the federal regulation of
securities advertising, and because the term itself is evocative of the dire stakes
at issue here. See infra Part III.B.3. The "blues" connection is merely slang
shorthand for the ban proposed by the Article. The usage here is inspired by
JACK KEROUAC, MEXICO CiTY BLUEs (1959) and BOB DYLAN, Tombstone
Blues, on HIGHWAY 61 REVISITED (Columbia Records 1965).
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advertising is limited to what is referred to under the federal
securities advertising regulatory regime as "tombstone" formatting:
plain letters, perhaps a simple picture, against a plain background,
describing a limited, prescribed set of information regarding the
advertised junk-food item.'
5 7
My proposal is not entirely fanciful, nor is the analysis
supporting it merely an academic exercise. 158 As discussed earlier,
the FTC proposed banning all television advertising to children in the
late-1970s. I" 9 Despite the fact that the FTC does not appear to have
the appetite for it, Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) proposed
legislation in June 2004 that would broadly empower the FTC to
restrict advertising of food and beverages to children, and which
would ban junk-food advertising to children in schools altogether.16
0
Further, other nations suffering their own childhood obesity
crises have begun to respond, in part, by restricting junk-food
advertising. Sweden, for example, has implemented a near total ban
on any advertising directed at children under the age of twelve.'
6'
Similarly, Canadian law purports to prohibit all advertising directed
at children under thirteen.' 6 2 Other countries have less complete, but
still significant, bans: Belgium bans all advertising during children's
television programming, and Australia bans advertisements during
157. As I discuss further infra Part III.B.3, the tombstone blues proposal is
not only modeled on the near total ban on securities advertising prescribed by
federal regulations, it is advanced for similar reasons-in particular, the
vulnerability of the consumer vis-t-vis the enormous power of the seller to
mislead with respect to the offered item.
158. While it is not merely an academic exercise, it is, indeed, an academic
exercise--one that I hope may prove useful to other projects evaluating the
wisdom and plausibility of commercial speech regulation, irrespective of the
programmatic conclusions drawn here.
159. See supra Part II.C.1.
160. Harkin's bill would, inter alia, allow:
the Federal Trade Commission to issue regulations that restrict the
marketing or advertising of foods and beverages to children under the
age of 18 years if the [FTC] determines that there is evidence that
consumption of certain foods and beverages is detrimental to the
health of children or it determines advertising to children to be unfair
or deceptive.
S. 2558, 108th Cong. § 302 (as introduced to the Senate, June 22, 2004).
161. Story & French, supra note 74, at 13-14.
162. See Karla K. Gower, Looking Northward: Canada's Approach
to Commercial Expression, 10 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 29, 50 (2005); see, e.g.,
Consumer Protectioh Act, R.S.Q., c. P-40.1, §§ 248, 249 (2005).
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television programming directed at preschoolers.' 63  While the
constitutional analysis advanced in this Article does not directly join
a discussion of the legal standing of these bans in foreign countries,
their existence at least suggests that such an approach is not wholly
inconsistent with democratic practices and values.
The next Pait of this Article argues that, in the proper form, a
junk-food advertising ban is both wise and constitutionally viable. It
is hoped that this exegesis may contribute generally to a freshened
understanding of the commercial speech doctrine, even if my
application of the analysis to a proposed junk food advertising ban is
unsatisfying to the reader.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PERMISSIBILITY OF
BANNIN4G JUNK-FOOD ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN
A. Dispositionism and the Modern Commercial Speech Doctrine
I began my case for a junk-food advertising ban by citing to
Justice Thomas's facetiously intended argument in Lorillard, a case
in which the Court struck down on First Amendment grounds
Massachusetts's attempt to regulate tobacco product advertising on
billboards directed at children. 164 The holding in Lorillard should
give pause to anyone who is sanguine about government's power to
regulate junk-food advertising to children. Nevertheless, in what
follows I argue f that it need only give pause, and that neither
Lorillard, nor other recent cases commonly seen as indicating that
the Court is trending towards higher levels of scrutiny for
commercial speech regulations, 165 preclude a junk-food advertising
ban such as my tombstone blues proposal.
163. Story & French, supra note 74, at 14.
164. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 587-88 (2001).
Although, the Court also held that several of the Massachusetts regulations at
issue were preempted by federal law regulating tobacco products, the Court did
not hesitate to reach and decide the First Amendment issues presented. Id. at
541. The Massachusetts regulations pertained also to cigar and smokeless
tobacco advertising, neither of which is regulated by the federal government.
Id. at 533.
165. See infra Part III.A.1.
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1. Basic Overview of the Commercial Speech Doctrine
The commercial speech doctrine is of relatively recent
constitutional vintage. Until the 1970s, the Court considered
commercial speech to be merely an aspect of economic activity, and
therefore held that such speech could be regulated to the same extent
as the underlying commercial practice. 166 In the 1970s, this view
came under scrutiny by legal scholars. In a seminal article, Professor
Martin Redish identified several problems with the Court's view that
purely commercial speech enjoyed no First Amendment
protection. 167  Most importantly, Redish recognized that much
commercial speech serves First Amendment values by proliferating
information of political, social, economic, and personal importance,
just as do other forms of speech that have traditionally been granted
constitutional protection for the purpose of serving that function.
168
Redish argued that Commercial speech should be afforded
constitutional protection because listeners have an interest in the
content of such speech. 1
69
In 1976, the Court turned away from its commercial speech
precedent and adopted the basic view set out by Redish. In Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.,170 the Court invalidated a Virginia statute that 'prohibited
pharmacists from advertising the price of prescription drugs. 17 1 The
Court announced that a commercial advertisement is constitutionally
protected because it furthers the societal interest in the free flow of
166. See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding that
"the Constitution imposes no... restraint on government as respects purely
commercial advertising," and rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a New
York City ordinance forbidding commercial pamphleting on city streets). In
truth, the Valentine court engaged in little analysis as to whether "purely
commercial" speech is protected, but merely presumed that it was not. See
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513-14 (1959) (Douglas, J., who
had taken part in Valentine, concurring) ("[Valentine] held that business
advertisements and commercial matters did not enjoy the protection of the First
Amendment .... The ruling was casual, almost offhand. And it has not
survived reflection.").
167. See Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace:
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 429 (1971).
168. Id. at 432-34.
169. See id.
170. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
171. Id. at 769.
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commercial information.1
72
Redish had argued in support of commercial speech protection
by highlighting the Court's analysis in New York Times v. Sullivan,
173
in which the Court sanctified the principle that a central purpose of
the First Amendment is to lend support to the production and
dissemination of information crucial to the healthy functioning of a
democratic society. 174 To that end, the Sullivan Court famously held
that no liability could attach to a newspaper for negligently
publishing defamatory statements about a public official.'
5
Permitting liability to attach for negligently false statements would
threaten to chill the dissemination of truthful, valuable speech.'
76
The Court insisted on providing wide latitude for experimentation
and mistake in the context of political speech.' 77 In fashioning the
modem commercial speech doctrine, however, the Court departed
from this crucial feature of Sullivan. The problem of over-
deterrence, the Court concluded, has far less purchase in connection
with purely commercial speech than it does with regard to political
speech. 178  The iCourt explained this most clearly in its second
cornerstone modem commercial speech case, Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona. 1
79
Advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading of course
is subject to restraint. Since the advertiser knows his
product and has a commercial interest in its dissemination,
we have little worry that regulation to assure truthfulness
will discourage protected speech. And any concern that
strict requirements for truthfulness will undesirably inhibit
spontaneity seems inapplicable because commercial speech
generally is calculated. Indeed, the public and private
172. Id. at 765 ("To this end, the free flow of commercial information is
indispensable.").
173. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
174. Id. at 266; see Redish, supra note 167, at 435-36.
175. Redish, supra note 167, at 436.
176. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 300-01.
177. The Court further reasoned that there is no concern with over-deterring
knowingly or recklessly false speech about a political figure, and so such
valueless speech could be prohibited directly without inhibiting the wide
latitude that must be provided to ensure the free flow of useful speech. Id. at
291.
178. See id.
179. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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benefits from commercial speech derive from confidence in
its accuracy and reliability. Thus, the leeway for untruthful
or misleading expression that has been allowed in other
contexts has little force in the commercial arena.1
8 0
Other justifications have been offered for allowing firmer
government regulation of false and misleading speech in commercial
than in non-commercial contexts, but the reasons specified here are
the most enduring and important: commercial speakers have great
knowledge of the truth or falsity of their speech, so it is easy for
them to limit themselves to truthful speaking, and the profit-motive
impelling commercial speech makes certain that such speech will be
undeterred by aggressive regulation.' 18  Though only the last
180. Id. at 383-84 (internal citations omitted). Bates, of course, concerned
advertising by a lawyer. First Amendment scholars have sometimes treated the
Court's many lawyer advertising cases as a kind of distinct eddy swirling off to
the side of mainstream commercial speech analysis. See Alex Kozinki &
Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REv. 627, 630
(1990) ("At present, the law of attorney advertising has grown to such an
extent that it has been able to seal itself off from its roots in first amendment
theory."); see also Smolla, supra note 124, at 1290 n.41 ("Lawyer advertising
at times appears to be regarded as a 'second class' commercial speech citizen,
not entitled to full participation in the free speech privileges and immunities
other advertisers enjoy."). In my view, the lawyer advertising cases play a
pivotal part in the architecture of the modem commercial speech doctrine. The
Court itself, as is evidenced in the quote in the text that attends this footnote,
has never treated such cases as fundamentally different from other commercial
speech cases, and routinely relies on lawyer advertising cases in non-lawyer
commercial speech cases. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S.
525, 528 (2001) (citing Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995)); 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 5.17 U.S. 484, 498 (1996) (citing Bates).181. The Court has identified several other justifications for affording less
constitutional protection to commercial speech. One justification is the speech
is of lesser value than political speech. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 81 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The commercial
aspect of a message may provide a justification for regulation that is not
present when the communication has no commercial character."). Another
justification is that the need to regulate commercial speech would necessarily
level the protections afforded political speech if both forms of speech were
reviewed under the same standard. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 579 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("[I]t is important that the commercial speech concept not be
defined too broadly lest speech deserving of greater constitutional protection
be inadvertently suppressed."). Yet another justification is that because
government enjoys the greater power to restrict or forbid a particular kind of
commercial enterprise, it must enjoy the lesser power to regulate the
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justification may: survive scrutiny, it is enough to sustain effective
government regulation of commercial speech, at least with respect to
junk-food advertising to children, in light of the enormity of
contemporary corporate power.1
8 2
Although he was certain that commercial speech should be
afforded some constitutional protection, Redish was himself initially
agnostic as to exactly what level of scrutiny should attach to
commercial speech regulation. 8 3  After establishing the basic
principles of its modem commercial speech doctrine in Virginia
Pharmacy and Bates, the Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York 8 4 formalized its
approach to commercial speech cases, laying out a four-part test that
establishes an "intermediate" level of review:
[1] At the outset, we must determine whether the expression
is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial
speech to come within that provision, it at least must
concern lawful activity and not be misleading. [2] Next, we
ask whether the asserted governmental interest is
substantial. [3] If both inquiries yield positive answers, we
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and [4] whether it is not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.'
8 5
This test has guided the Court's approach to every commercial
advertising of such enterprises. See, e.g., Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot,
521 U.S. 457, 475-76 (1997) ("While the First Amendment unquestionably
protects the individual producer's right to advertise its own brands...
[a]ppropriate respect for the power of Congress... provides abundant support
for the constitutionality of these marketing orders.").
182. "Power economics," which predicts that market forces will compel
corporations to discover and exploit situational influence over consumers even
where there is no conscious intention to do so on the part of corporate officers,
may cut against the "greater access to the truth of the speech" justification
advanced in support of lesser protections for commercial than for non-
commercial speech. See supra text accompanying note 57. On the enormity of
corporate. power in contemporary American society, see Hanson & Yosifon,
The Situation, supra note 21, at 193-203.
183. See Redish, supra note 167, at 447.
184. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
185. Id. at 565. The Court describes the Central Hudson test as being very
similar to the test it uses to analyze "time, place, and manner" restrictions on
constitutionally protected speech. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533
U.S. 525, 573 (2001).
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speech case since Central Hudson. In recent years, however,
commentators and several justices have urged the Court to drop
Central Hudson in favor of the "strict scrutiny" that it traditionally
applies to government regulations aimed at non-commercial
speech. 86 Indeed, even as the Court has formally maintained
allegiance to Central Hudson, some commentators argue that the
Court's practice in commercial speech cases in fact evinces a trend
towards stricter levels of scrutiny,18 7 a trend which may portend a
coming end to Central Hudson, but which in any event is crafting a
commercial speech jurisprudence which increasingly restrains
government efforts to regulate commercial speech.1
88
Professor Redish himself today contends that there is no
principled justification for denying commercial speech the same
level of First Amendment protection as is afforded non-commercial
speech. 18 9 He shares the view of other First Amendment scholars
who see in the maintenance of a special category of "commercial
speech" a genuine threat to core free speech interests. 9° Redish
warns that any argument licensing greater government regulation of
commercial speech can, by logical extension, be deployed against
social and political speech as well; such arguments must therefore be
avoided, Redish insists, if First Amendment interests are to be
served.191 For example, the argument that the robustness of the
186. See, e.g., Smolla, supra note 124, at 1292; Kozinki & Banner, supra
note 180; see also Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring); 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996).
187. See, e.g., Smolla, supra note 124, at 1292 ("[E]xamination of the actual
case decisions demonstrates that the trajectory of modem commercial speech
law has been an accelerating rise of protection for advertising.").
188. Id.
189. Martin H. Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the
Commercial Speech Distinction: The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N.
KY. L. REv. 553, 565 (1997) ("[C]areful examination reveals that without
question, none of the remaining arguments relied upon to justify commercial
speech's second class status justifies the distinction's continued existence.").
190. See Kozinki & Banner, supra note 180, at 630; see also Rodney A.
Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment.: A Case for Expansive
Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEx. L. REv. 777 (1992-1993); cf Alex
Kozinksi and Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial
Speech, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 747 (1993) (providing a brilliant historical analysis of
the commercial speech doctrine).
191. See Redish, 'supra note 189 (arguing that justifications for regulating
commercial speech threaten non-commercial speech freedoms). Below, I
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profit motive behind commercial speech can justify the government
prohibiting false and misleading speech altogether in the commercial
speech context without fear of over-deterring the production of
valuable speech, cannot be limited so as to apply only to commercial
speech. 192 After all, Redish argues, much non-commercial speech is
backed by very strong motives, such as a strong commitment to a
moral or political vision. 193 Redish has also extended his original
argument to contend that commercial speech is just as important to
people, perhaps even more important, as is social and political
speech. 194 Thus, the importance of commercial speech counsels in
favor of affording it at least as much First Amendment protection as
is thought to be appropriate for non-commercial speech.195 The only
coherent and normatively justifiable thing to do, Redish concludes, is
to treat commercial and non-commercial speech the same for First
Amendment purposes.1
96
I think that such a position is extremist and implausible. It
would have outrageous consequences if it were truly embraced. For
example, it must follow from Redish's view that business
corporations could not be held liable for merely negligent product
advertising. For instance, junk-food advertising that was merely
negligent in its failure to accurately to convey, say, a food's fat
content, could not be prohibited. Since there is no way to distinguish
commercial from non-commercial speech, and because commercial
speech is possibly more valuable than political speech, the concerns
that animated Sullivan must necessarily apply to commercial speech
as well. Thus, no claim based in negligent speech could stand
without unduly chilling commercial speech under this view. Such a
result would obviously work an extremely radical alteration to
contemporary business regulation. 197
analyze the regulation of corporate political speech in the context of "deep
capture" advertising. See infra Part IV.
192. See Redish, supra note 189, at 578.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 579.
195. Id. at 564-65.
196. See id. at 583-84.
.197. Redish's insistence that arguments advanced to justify latitude for
commercial speech always threaten core political speech if accepted, is also
extreme and unavailing. Many kinds of speech are regulated for reasons that
could justify core political speech suppression if taken at a sufficient level of
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Redish does not recognize, let alone justify, such destructive
implications in his commercial speech theory. The oversight reflects
a general failure on the part of proponents of strict scrutiny
protection for commercial speech to appreciate the depth of the
problem posed by misleading and manipulative commercial speech.
Commercial speech serves First Amendment interests when it flows
both "freely and cleanly."'198  The insufficient attention to the
problem of ensuring the clean flow of commercial speech stems from
a too stylized and abstract conception of human information
processing, a dispositionist conception which tends not to see the
manipulative power of commercial speech, and where it does see it,
expresses an unwarranted confidence that the problem of misleading
or manipulative speech can always be solved with more speech. 199
abstraction. Consider, for example, restrictions on comments to the press
by a lawyer about an ongoing trial in which she is involvent. The abstract
justifications for such a restriction-protecting the legal system's interest in
the sanctity of the trial process--could also be applied to limit press coverage
of ongoing trials. But abstract reckonings did not render the contours of the
First Amendment; experience draws the lines that limit the applicability of
given justifications. Thus, while lawyers may not speak freely, the press may.
Redish's assertion that the "robustness" justification cannot be contained to
commercial speech has certain appeal as an analytic proposition, but upon
inspection there remain "common sense" distinctions between commercial and
non-commercial speech, which make the robustness justification more
reasonable when applied to commercial speech. See Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) ("Our commercial speech
doctrine rests heavily on 'the "common-sense" distinction between speech
proposing a commercial transaction... and other varieties of speech,' and
appellant's advertisements undeniably propose a commercial transaction."
(citation omitted)). Commercial speech is concerned with proposing a
commercial transaction, the truth about which the commercial speaker has, or
should have, particular knowledge (respecting the attributes of the product, the
price at which it is offered, etc.). The profit motive drives the communication
of this particular 'knowledge. These two factors, profit motive and
particularized knowledge, working in tandem, create the robustness
justification, and the absence of this tandem in other categories of speech, such
as social and political speech, limits its application to the commercial speech
context. In any event, to the extent that the robustness of speech provides a
compelling reason for greater regulatory latitude in other areas, that greater
regulatory latitude should be considered in those areas as well. See, for
example, my discussion of "drown out" and "overwhelmance" justifications
for limiting corporate social and political speech, infra text accompanying
notes 383-399.
198. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
199. In his seminal article on commercial speech and the First Amendment,
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Under this view, there is no need, much less justification, for
restricting commercial speech. 0 If it is accepted, as critical realism
urges, that intuition un-criticized yields a false conception of human
agency, one that does not clearly appreciate human vulnerability to
manipulation by commercial speech, then the problem of
manipulative speech must become a central concern in commercial
Redish admitted that "much of advertising is directed not to appeal to the
individual's intellectual, rational capacities, but rather to a consumer's
subconscious, irrational desires or self-image." Redish, supra note 167, at 446.
But Redish was nonplused:
[T]he first amendment's basis is primarily normative rather than
factual. Although the first amendment assumes that man has a will
and an intellect, its concern is that he should use them; it does not turn
on whether he does use them. The less he does use them, the greater
is the need to encourage their use. The more non-rational appeals that
are made, the more important it is to protect appeals with a rational
basis.
Id. I discuss the inadequacy of the "more speech" retort to the problem posed
by misleading speech in Part IV.
200. For example, in his seminal writings on tobacco advertising, Professor
Redish glosses over the widely expressed concern that tobacco advertising has
powerfully mislead consumers in a manner that grossly misconstrues that
concern. "Some argue," he writes, "that regardless of its content, tobacco
advertising is inherently misleading in suggesting or implying that use of such
a harmful product can ever be a positive or beneficial experience." Redish,
supra note 153, at 598. This parlor version of the debate about tobacco
advertising makes no attempt to engage the extensive social scientific and legal
theoretic study of the power tobacco advertising to mislead consumers about
the health risks associated with smoking. See, e.g., Jon Hanson & Kyle Logue,
The Costs of Cigarettes, 111 YALE L.J. 1163 (2002); Jon Hanson & Douglas
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market
Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1420 (1999) (reviewing decades of social
scientific study of the manipulative power of cigarette advertising). Elsewhere,
Redish treats the problem of the misleading power of advertising as a matter of
logical indeterminacy. For instance, Redish writes in his discussion of adver-
tising campaigns that employ messages of health and vitality in connection
with smoking: "The fact that an activity is portrayed in advertising as
pleasurable does not necessarily imply that the activity is also healthful."
Redish, supra note 153, at 609. Of course it does not necessarily imply that,
but the fact that such a conclusion is not necessary is hardly conclusive as to
whether or not it does yield a misleading implication. For Redish, the question
of what advertising does is indeterminate, and because of the First
Amendment's presumption in favor of speech, the tie of the analytic
uncertainty goes to speech. But, this need not be a matter of analytic un-
certainty. It can become, and is treated here, as a question of critical inquiry
and distinction.
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speech theory. A commercial speech theory focused only on the
"free" and not the "clean" flow of commercial information serves the
profit-making interests of commercial speakers, but not the listener
interests that granting First Amendment status to commercial speech
was meant to protect.
In what follows, I analyze the modem commercial speech
doctrine, and its supposed recent tightening, from a critical realist
perspective. I hope to demonstrate that the doctrine is capable,
analytically and normatively, of accommodating a ban on junk-food
advertising such as the "Tombstone Blues."
2. Downward Sloping Demand Curves and the Centrality of the
Dispositional Actor in the Commercial Speech Doctrine
The core theory of the modem commercial speech doctrine
conforms to a highly dispositionist conception of human agency.
People are construed as receiving and rationally analyzing advertised
information in order to exercise consumer choices that satisfy their
preferences and make them better off.20 1 In this section, I will argue
that the Court always forbids the regulation of commercial speech
where the avowed or implicit purpose of the regulation is the
suppression of dispositional choice. In Central Hudson, the Court
purported to express a balancing test, but from the earliest
commercial speech cases, the Court has consistently refused to find
that the suppression of dispositional choice through the prohibition
of truthful, non-iisleading information could be countenanced by
the First Amendment.
20 2
This analysis explains an important adjudicative line in the
commercial speech cases, spanning from the earliest annunciation of
the modem commercial speech doctrine through the most recent
cases. It does not, however, explain all of the cases, or all that the
Court has had to say in formulating its jurisprudence in this area.
There is also imminent in the commercial speech doctrine, I will
argue, a conception of the situational character. Where the Court
201. See supra Part III.A. 1 (summarizing fundamental presumptions of the
rational actor and other dispositionist models of human agency).
202. Readers familiar with the commercial speech cases may immediately
conjure Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company of Puerto
Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986), as a contrary example. I address Posadas,
infra Part III.B.2. (reconciling Posadas and 44 Liquormart).
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appreciates, or is made to appreciate, the powerful, situational
influence of advertising, the Court expresses a willingness to
countenance commercial speech regulation. It is this latter aspect of
the commercial speech doctrine that the tombstone blues develops
and exploits. A crucial step in that endeavor, however, is to examine
and explain the central part played by the conception of the
dispositional actor that, to be sure, now resides at the core of the
commercial speech doctrine.
The dispositional actor is present in its most essential form at the
forging of the commercial speech doctrine in Virginia Pharmacy.
20 3
That formative case involved, recall, the state of Virginia's total
204prohibition on plharmacist advertising of prescription drug prices.
Now, among the most hallowed scriptures of the dispositional/-
rational actor schema of consumer agency, is consumer response to
price.. 2 5  It is here that the Court has at its disposal the near
talismanic power of the "downward sloping demand curve."
The "downward sloping demand curve" refers to a basic
principle of economics which holds that because individuals
independently value commercial goods at a given price, demand for
a product will increase when the price of a product drops (because
more people will value it at a price greater than it is being sold at,
and will therefore be more likely to purchase it). In The Situational
Character, Professor Hanson and I argued that this basic framework
reflects, and is supported by, common sense dispositionism. 20 6 The
downward sloping demand curve trope reflects the strongly held
dispositionist intuition that consumers hold privately ordered
preferences that they bring to a given behavioral situation.207 It is the
intuitive plausibility of this simple dispositionist supply-and-demand
story that makes the basic rational actor model so easily digestible by
conventional legal analysis, and, it turns out, by the commercial
speech doctrine.2 °8 The parable of the downward sloping demand
203. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
204. See id.
205. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 21, at 145-57.
206. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 21, at
170-80.
207. See id. at 139-41.
208. The fact that demand curves do, in fact, slope downward-that is, that
demand does increase as price decreases, and decreases as price increases-is
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curve is ripe for incantation wherever price communication is
concerned. Where the communication of price information is
prohibited, the Court sees starkly the suppression of dispositional
choice, which it is the very purpose of the First Amendment to
enable and facilitate. Where the government avowedly seeks to limit
speech in order to interrupt that First Amendment task, as it did in
Virginia Pharmacy, the Court will call it a constitutional violation.
20 9
Indeed, most of the leading cases striking down advertising
regulations involve, at their core, the prohibition of price
advertising. 210 In each such case, the Court finds it impossible to see
how price advertising could be false or misleading, and impossible to
see how the proscription of such advertising could serve any
legitimate government interest. In Virginia Pharmacy, the state
argued that price advertising would result in price competition,
which would drive consumers to cheaper pharmacists with perhaps
lower standards of quality, thereby simultaneously harming the
professionalism of pharmacists and leaving consumers worse off.
2 11
The Court replied by invoking what has become an important axiom
of its commercial' speech jurisprudence:
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic
approach. That alternative is to assume that.., people will
often advanced as support for the view that consumers do behave rationally
and that the "rational actor" model represents a plausible modeling of human
behavior for use in economic and legal analysis. Jack Hirshleifer, The
Expanding Domain of Economics, 75 AM. ECON.. REv. 53, 53 (1985).
Important, un-rebutted arguments have also been made; however, the fact that
demand curves are downward sloping does not provide evidence that
consumers behave rationally. Nobel Prize winning economist Gary Becker
demonstrated that demand curves would slope in a downward fashion even if
consumers made consumption decisions randomly, rather than rationally,
because nearly every consumer has a limited amount of money to spend. See
id. at 153-70. I do not pursue this debate here, as I am centrally concerned
with analyzing the effect of the intuitive plausibility of what I am calling
the downward-sloping demand curve trope on the Court's commercial
speech jurisprudence.
209. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773.
210. Either by the regulation singling out price advertising in particular, or
by the regulation banning all advertising relating to a legal product, including
price advertising. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484
(1996); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977);. Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748.
211. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 766-68.
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perceive their own best interests if only they are well
enough informed .... It is precisely this kind of choice,
between the dangers of suppressing information, and the
dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First
Amendment makes for us.
2 12
Precisely what the Court means is that the state may not advance
a paternalistic approach through speech regulation, even though it
repeatedly recognizes in commercial speech cases that government
could directly prohibit or limit many of the activities that it often
impermissibly seeks to suppress through speech regulation.
213
This same vision of dispositional decision-making guides the
Court's analysis in Bates, where the Court invalidated on First
Amendment grounds an Arizona law forbidding lawyers from
advertising.214 The prohibition against lawyer advertising had deep
roots in the American legal profession; challenging this practice
would have been inconceivable before the revolution then underway
in the Court's commercial speech doctrine.215 Once again in Bates,
the Court's analysis focused on the government's ban on price
advertising.216  The Court could not see the furtherance of any
permissible purpose in such a prohibition: "[W]e view as dubious
any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance."
217
What is missing in price advertising bans, such as were presented in
Virginia Pharmacy and Bates, is any occasion for the Court to
212. Id. at 770.
213. Seeking to influence consumer behavior, such as suppressing
consumption of a particular good, is a permissible legislative purpose.
Forbidding prostitution or the recreational use of certain drugs are examples of
legislative regimes widely perceived as paternalistic yet constitutionally
permissible. See J.L. Hill, The Five Faces of Freedom in American Political
and Constitutional Thought, 45 B.C. L. REV. 499, 539 n.144 (2004) ("[L]aws
prohibiting gambling, drug use, prostitution, and abortion have both a moral
and a paternalistic aspect.").
214. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 350.
215. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW
AND ETHICS 799-809 (7th ed. 2005).
216. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 350.
217. Id. at 375 (emphasis added). The earnestness with which the Court
strikes down advertising regulations thought to be advanced for the purpose of
manipulating choice evinces, in my view, a faithful opposition to manipulation
that may be exploited in the development of a more robust understanding of
the manipulative power of advertising than is presently evident in the
commercial speech doctrine.
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encounter the situational power of advertising, immersed as it is in
the quintessential explanation of dispositional behavior - price
influence
When we turn from these now classic commercial speech cases
to the more recent cases, we see, in my view, merely an application
of this core principle. For example, in an important commercial
speech case decided in 1996, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,218
the Court struck down on First Ammendment grounds a Rhode
Island law prohibiting the advertising of liquor prices.2 19 Aside from
pertaining to the sale of liquor rather than prescription drugs or legal
services, the regulation at issue in 44 Liqourmart was very similar to
the regulations struck down in Virginia Pharmacy and Bates.220 The
Court's analysis of the ban in 44 Liqourmart was also broadly
similar to that employed in those early cases, but coming after
Central Hudson, the 44 Liquormart analysis was framed in terms of
the Central Hudson test.
221
The Central Hudson test, recall, first requires the Court to
determine whether the commercial speech at issue concerns a lawful
activity and is "not misleading." 222  If those conditions are not
satisfied, the speech does not come within First Amendment
protection.223 1 argue below that the commercial speech doctrine is
unfortunately, but promisingly, underdeveloped with respect to the
first step of the Central Hudson test.224 One of the chief reasons for
this is that litigants seeking to defend commercial speech regulation,
principally state attorneys general and state bar associations, have
218. 51.7 U.S. 484 (1996).
219. See id.
220. The Court's most recent commercial speech case, Thompson v. Western
States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357 (2002), presented yet another echo of the
basic ban at issue in Virginia Pharmacy. Thompson concerned a total ban on
the advertising of "qompound" drugs that are exempted from the FDA's review
process, yet legal to consume with a doctor's prescription. Id. The govern-
ment again waived any inquiry into the misleading power of the advertising,
forcing the Court to conclude that the ban "amounts to a fear that people would
make bad decisions if given truthful information about compounded drugs."
Id. at 377. Because this fear could not be patronized through speech regulation
without violating the First Amendment, the ban was overturned. Id.
221. 44 Liqourmart, 517 U.S. at 492.
222. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 564-65 (1980).
223. Id.
224. See infra text accompanying note 238.
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repeatedly conceded the first step of the inquiry to the party
challenging the regulation, making their defensive stand instead on
the second, "balancing" part of the test, which asks if the regulation
advances a substantial government interest in a manner no more
restrictive than necessary to accomplish that interest. For instance,
the Rhode Island attorney general followed this pattern in 44
Liquormart, conceding that the banned advertising was not
misleading, and arguing instead that the state had a substantial
interest in promoting temperance, an interest that the advertising ban
furthered in a sufficiently tailored fashion.
225
Approaching the case in such a posture, the Court refused to
sustain the liquor-price advertising ban, holding once again that the
First Amendment prohibits the restriction of dispositional choice
through the prohibition of truthif, nonmisleading speech.226 Even
though the government could otherwise limit the choice to purchase
alcohol-such as by forbidding purchases on a Sunday-it could not
do so by regulating truthful non-commercial speech without running
afoul of the First Amendment. 227 The government may not keep
commercial information from consumers out of a fear that they will
perceive the information correctly and act on it in a manner that the
government believes inimical to consumers' interests.22 8  Justice
Thomas, in his 44 Liquormart concurrence, urged the adoption of
strict scrutiny for such cases, for reasons that I have argued already
shape the Court's heartland commercial speech jurisprudence:
[Where] the government's asserted interest is to keep legal
users of a pr9duct or service ignorant in order to manipulate
their choices in the marketplace, the balancing test...
should not be applied, in my view. Rather, such an 'interest'
is per se illegitimate and can no more justify regulation of
'commercial' speech than it can justify regulation of 'non-
commercial' speech.229
The case perhaps most strongly thought to signal an expanding
protection in the Court's contemporary commercial speech
225. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 504.
226. Id. at 496 (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)).
227. Id. at 496-97.
228. Id. at 497 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
229. Id. at 518 (citation omitted).
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jurisprudence is Lorillard, introduced above, in which the Court
overturned the state of Massachusetts's tobacco billboard advertising
ban. In the principal opinion in Lorillard, Justice O'Connor
recognized that Central Hudson seems to stand on precarious ground
as "several Members of the Court have expressed doubts about the
Central Hudson analysis and whether it should apply in particular
cases." 230 Nevertheless, O'Connor wrote, "we see no need to break
new ground. Central Hudson, as applied in our more recent
commercial speech cases, provides an adequate basis for
decision. ',231  Indeed, the reason Central Hudson provided an
"adequate basis for decision" is that in cases involving the admitted
restriction of truthful nonmisleading information for the purpose of
disabling dispositional choice, the Court's scrutiny has been
forbidding.
In Lorillard, the Court struck down the Massachusetts billboard
advertising ban, despite the fact that the regulation purported only to
regulate advertising directed at children, which the ban sought to
accomplish by forbidding such advertising within 1000 feet of
schools.232 The Court accepted that the state has a substantial
interest in reducing children's consumption of tobacco-that interest
was indisputable given that tobacco is illegal for children to
consume. 233  The legitimacy of advancing this interest through a
billboard advertising ban, however, had to be balanced against the
ban's incursion on the First Amendment interests of adults,2 4 for it is
a bedrock First Amendment principle that "the government interest
in protecting children from harmful materials.., does not justify
unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults.
' 235
230. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001).
231. Id. at 554-55 (citations omitted). Justice Thomas, in his Lorillard
concurrence, further developed his view that commercial speech should be
afforded the same protections, and analyzed under the same strict scrutiny
framework, as non-commercial speech. In Lorillard, Thomas wrote: "I share
the Court's view that the regulations fail even the intermediate scrutiny of
Central Hudson... [but] I continue to believe that when the government seeks
to restrict truthful speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys, strict
scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech in question may be
characterized as 'commercial."' Id. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring).
232. Id. at 566.
233. See id. at 564.
234. Id.
235. Id. (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997)).
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In the Court's colorful phrasing, "[t]he level of discourse reaching a
mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for
a sandbox."
236
In Lorillard, the government again irredeemably sandbagged its
own case by its unwise waiver of the first part of the Central Hudson
inquiry.237 The government did not need to show that the advertising
was false or misleading to justify its suppression vis-a-vis children-
but to show that the speech was not unwarrantedly kept from adults,
the question of whether it was false or misleading, or truthful and
informative, becomes exceedingly important. With the state waiving
this issue, the Court was left to analyze the propriety of what it
considered to be "[iln some geographical areas ... nearly a complete
ban on the communication of truthful information about [tobacco
products] to adult consumers. '238 As Justice Thomas noted in his
236. Id. (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74
(1983)).
237 Id. at 555 ("The Attorney General has assumed for purposes of
summary judgment that petitioners' speech is entitled to First Amendment
protection.").
238. Id. at 562. The Court's characterization of the effect of the ban is
grossly overbroad, even ridiculous. Even with the Massachusetts ban in place,
tobacco companies could still communicate truthful information about tobacco
products to adults through print advertising or direct mailing. The regulations
also permitted retailers to indicate through limited signage that they sold
tobacco products. See id. at 536. The Court's treatment in Lorillard is terribly
disappointing, even embarrassing, in its failure to engage at all the obvious
"captive audience" problem presented by billboard advertising, a problem the
Court had actually addressed in a fairly sophisticated fashion in a tobacco
billboard advertising prohibition case seventy years before Lorillard. In
Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932), the Court upheld a Utah
prohibition of tobacco advertising on billboards against constitutional
challenge:
Advertisements' of this sort are constantly before the eyes of observers
on the streets and in street cars to be seen without the exercise of
choice or volition on their part. Other forms of advertising are
ordinarily seen as a matter of choice on the part of the observer. The
young people as well as the adults have the message of the billboard
thrust upon them by all the arts and devices that skill can produce. In
the case of newspapers and magazines, there must be some seeking by
the one who is to see and read the advertisement. The radio can be
turned off, but not so the billboard or street car placard. These
distinctions clearly place this kind of advertisement in a position to be
classified so that regulations or prohibitions may be imposed upon all
within the class. This is impossible with respect to newspapers or
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concurrence, "[t]hese concessions... make this an easy case, one
clearly controlled by 44 Liquormart."2 39 Left with no other way of
construing the advertising's influence on adult consumers, the waiver
of the first part of the Central Hudson test leaves the balancing
inquiry in Lorillard to be controlled by the deductively applicable
principle that discourse to adults cannot be limited to what is
appropriate for the sandbox.
B. Beyond Downward-Sloping Demand Curves-The Situational
Character and the Commercial Speech Doctrine
The commercial speech doctrine thus reflects and entrenches a
highly dispositionist conception of human agency. The core of the
Court's jurisprudence in this area revolves around a stylized picture
of a rational actor accumulating information, the better to make
consumption decisions that are in her own best interest.
Yet, one reason that dispositionist expression is so clearly
evident in commercial speech jurisprudence is because it is the
expression that we, in our dispositionism, are primed to see. If this
orientation can be restrained, a second strand of reasoning can be
discerned in the commercial speech cases, one that evidences a latent
recognition and willingness to accommodate the reality of the
situational character. In the previous section, I argued that where the
Court sees government constraining dispositional choice through
speech prohibition, the Court inevitably strikes the regulation
down.240 However, where the Court has occasion to recognize the
magazines. The legislature may recognize degrees of evil and adapt
its legislation accordingly.
Id. The principle opinion in Lorillard cites Packer just once, for a proposition
concerning the presumption of no federal preemption of areas of traditional
state regulation, but without discussion or even mentioning that the case
involved the regulation of billboard advertising of tobacco products. Lorillard,
533 U.S. at 541. The failure to engage this troubling dimension of billboard
advertising is another consequence of the lack of any critical inquiry into the
effect of the advertising due to the state's waiver of the first part of the Central
Hudson test.
239. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 578.
240. There is language in Central Hudson itself intimating that the Court
would have countenanced a paternalistic purpose at the heart of a ban on
advertising promoting energy consumption. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 573 (1980) ("[I]t leaves open the
possibility that the State may suppress advertising of electricity in order to
lessen demand for electricity."). But the Court did overturn the ban at issue in
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situational power of advertising to influence human thinking and
behavior in unseen, potentially manipulative ways, the Court sustains
the advertising regulation, or at least indicates that it would be
willing to do so if the case for the situational character were made.
24'
This line of reasoning makes clear that the First Amendment does
not sanctify any particular conception of human decision-making.
The government need not embrace an intuitive conception of human
agency - if it makes the case, it may regulate with reference to a
more scientifically informed model of consumer behavior. The
adoption, on the'part of the government, of a situational character
view of human agency, might produce acceptable, prudent
commercial speech regulation that would be inconceivable, or
conceived of as unwise, under a highly dispositionist framework.
1. Seeing the Situational Character in the Commercial Speech Cases
While this second strain in the commercial speech doctrine is
evident even in Virginia Pharmacy,242 it is easier to grasp in Bates,
which, together with Virginia Pharmacy, outlined the core principles
of the Court's modem commercial speech doctrine prior to its formal
expression in Central Hudson.243 As noted, once the two-part
Central Hudson test was established, it separated for the purposes of
analytic inquiry the question of whether speech was false or
misleading on the one hand, and, if it was not, whether the
challenged regulation nevertheless furthered a substantial govern-
ment interest in a sufficiently tailored fashion, on the other.
244
Litigants, perhaps looking wide-eyed at the intermediate balancing
standard promised in the test's second part, have routinely skipped
over the first part of the test, waiving the issue of whether the
Central Hudson (on the grounds that it was overbroad) and has, in fact, never
allowed an avowedly paternalistic purpose to support commercial speech
regulation. Id. at 565; see also Redish, supra note 153, at 613 ("At most, the
Court's acceptance' of the pro-paternalism model in Central Hudson was
dictum, and implied dictum, at that.").
241. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 348
(1986) (sustaining a ban on casino advertising to Puerto Rican residents).
242. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) ("[M]uch commercial speech is not provably false,
or even wholly false, but only deceptive or misleading. We foresee no obstacle
to a State's dealing effectively with this problem.").
243. See supra text accompanying note 180.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 184-185.
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commercial speech at issue is "misleading."245 In Bates, the analysis
was not yet so bifurcated. Bates therefore provides an opportunity to
glimpse the Court grappling directly with the "misleading"
246question.
At issue in Bates, beyond the price advertising prohibition, was,
for example, the defendant lawyers' advertising describing their low-
fee services as a "legal clinic"-a usage which the state claimed was
misleading to consumers, and could thus be proscribed without
violation of the First Amendment. 247 It is not exactly clear how the
Court went about scrutinizing this assertion, but it appears that the
Court just eyeballed it with a kind of rough situation-sense:
On this record, these assertions [of the ways the term could
be misleading] are unpersuasive. We suspect that the public
would readily understand the term 'legal clinic'-if, indeed,
it focused on the term at all-to refer to an operation like
that of appellants' that is geared to provide standardized and
multiple services.
248
The Court concludes that the term is not misleading; after all,
"the clinical concept in the sister profession of medicine surely by
now is publicly acknowledged and understood. ,
249
245. See infra text accompanying notes 248-256, suggesting that another
reason for this pattern is because government approaches commercial speech
regulation with an underdeveloped conception of consumer behavior and
decision-making, and so focuses on the second part of the test, which does not
critically inquire about the sources of such behavior.
246. See supra note 180, arguing that the lawyer advertising cases play a
fundamental part in the Court's commercial speech jurisprudence.
247. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 378-79 (1977).
248. Id. at 381. While the second part of the Central Hudson test is a classic
formulation of "intermediate scrutiny," it is not at all clear what standard of
review the Court applies to the first part of the test with respect to whether
speech is "false" or "misleading" and therefore entitled to First Amendment
protection at all. The lawyer advertising cases reveal an analytic approach
which might be said to be a kind of constitutional version of what Karl
Llewellyn called "situation sensing." See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation,
supra note 21, at 293-98 (analyzing the latent dispositionism in Llewellyn's
"situation sense" theory); cf Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment,
Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog that Didn't Bark, 1994 SUP.
CT. REV. 1, 40-41 (urging the application of "contextualization" in
constitutional analysis, but also observing that "[c]elebrations of situation
sense and practical reason frequently dissolve into philosophical mush").
249. Bates, 433 U.S. at 382. On the other hand, people might more readily
think that a "legal clinic" involved some kind of public-service workshop,
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Justice Powell saw things differently and dissented.2 50  His
departure from the majority stemmed simply from his differing
naked-eye assessment of whether the advertising at issue was, in fact,
misleading: "The average lay person simply has no feeling for which
services are included in the packaged divorce, and thus no capacity
to judge the nature of the advertised product. As a result, the type of
advertisement before us inescapably will mislead many who respond
to it.",251  Powell looked at the price listings for so-called
standardized legal services in the legal clinic's advertising-such as
prices for uncontested divorces or wills-finds they are misleading,
and thus that they can be prohibited without Constitutional offense.
Now, the question of whether people are misled by a for-profit
law firm advertising itself as a "legal clinic" is an empirical one. In
the context of advertising involving the legal profession, the Court
betrays a particular confidence in its knowledge of what is or is not
misleading to consumers-this is, after all, the one area of social life
about which the Court may consider itself to have a peculiar
knowledge. A footnote in Powell's dissent makes this clear:
A high percentage of couples seeking counsel as to divorce
desire initially that it be uncontested. They often describe
themselves as civilized people who have mutually agreed to
separate; they want a quiet, out-of-court divorce without
alimony. Bit experienced counsel knows that the initial
spirit of amity often fades quickly when the collateral
problems are carefully explored.252
Put differently, Powell appreciated that people may be misled
because they think of themselves as rational actors who will bring
stable preferences with them to the circumstance of obtaining a
divorce. But Powell implicitly understood that people are in fact
situational characters; that the situation of divorce-the legal
proceedings, the coming acrimony, etc., will alter their preferences
and behavior in ways they may not anticipate or appreciate.
Reviewing the lawyer's divorce advertising against that reality, rather
than against consumers' own intuitions about themselves, the
advertising can be seen as potentially misleading. Importantly, the
rather than a for-profit enterprise.
250. Id. at 389.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 394 n.5.
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view of the matter that counts is not the lay belief, but the learned
one.
Powell's comment comes in dissent, but the majority differs only
in their assessment of consumer reaction to the speech, not in their
analytic approach.253 Both the majority and the dissent make an
empirical judgment about whether the advertisement is misleading or
not, and that judgment determines the constitutional status of the
speech. Both the majority and the dissent rely on their own
experience and intuition to determine whether the advertisement is
misleading or not. In the preceding sections, I argued that social
science reveals that our intuitions about what is moving us, or how
things affect us, is often wrong.254 There is, however, nothing in
these cases that suggests that our intuitive presumptions about what
moves us have strong constitutional standing-indeed, the Court in
Bates seems to be relying on its own sense that it has a highly
informed understanding about what does or does not influence
consumers of legal services. Despite the fact that litigants, and the
Court itself, often rely on mere intuition to analyze potentially
"misleading" speech, intuitive presumptions enjoy no sacred status
and may be repudiated by empirically driven argument seeking to
impose commercial speech restrictions.
In another important lawyer advertising case, In re R. M j,211
for example, the Court recognized that intuitions about what is
misleading, to whom, and in what contexts, may be wanting, and
indicated that its .approach to commercial speech regulation will be
solicitous of arguments that intuitions are wrong:
If experience with particular price advertising indicates that
the public is in fact misled or that disclaimers are
insufficient to prevent deception, then the matter would
come to the. Court in an entirely different posture. The
commercial speech doctrine is itself based in part on certain
empirical assumptions as to the benefits of advertising. If
experience proves that certain forms of advertising are in
fact misleading, although they did not appear at first to be
'inherently' misleading, the Court must take such experience
253. See id. at 353-85.
254. See supra Part II.B.1.
255. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
May 2006)
564 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:507
into account. 6
The Court also recognizes that specific methods of lawyer
advertising may present particular dangers, and thus many be
proscribed altogether. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn,2 57 for
example, the Court sustained a categorical prohibition of in-person
promotion of legal services to accident victims, recognizing that such
a practice is particularly conducive to overreaching and manipulation
on the part of the lawyer.25 8 "Although it is argued that personal
solicitation is valuable because it may apprise a victim of misfortune
of his legal rights," thus serving the information proliferating
function of the modem commercial speech doctrine, the Court
concluded that "the very plight of that person not only makes him
more vulnerable to influence but also may make advice all the more
intrusive."
259
I believe that the lawyer advertising cases provide an excellent
opportunity to understand how the commercial speech doctrine might
countenance a ban on the advertising of junk food to children.
Lawyer advertising is an area in which the Court feels particularly
confident to make judgments about consumer vulnerability to
commercial speech.2  In Bates, the Court wrote:
256. Id. at 200 n. 11. The lawyer in In re R. M J. had, in a fairly large font
on his print advertisement, indicated that he was admitted to practice before
"THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT." Id. at 197. Apparently being
admitted to the Supreme Court bar requires only the filing of some paperwork,
provided the applicant is already a member of the bar elsewhere in the United
States. See SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, INSTRUCTIONS FOR
ADMISSION TO THE BAR, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/bar/barinstructions.
pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2006); SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
bar/barapplication.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2006). The In re R. M . Court
found that the speech was protected, but only because the government failed to
allege manipulation, something the Court certainly seemed open to hearing:
[S]uch a statement could be misleading to the general public
unfamiliar with the requirements of admission to the Bar of this Court.
Yet there is no finding to this effect by the Missouri Supreme Court.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the inclusion of this
information was misleading. Nor does the Rule specifically identify
this information as potentially misleading ....
In re R. M J., 455 U.S. at 205-06 (emphasis added).
257. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
258. Id. at 467-68.
259. Id. at 465 (emphasis added).
260. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977).
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[B]ecause the public lacks sophistication concerning legal
services, misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed
unimportant in other advertising may be found quite
'inappropriate in legal advertising.... In sum, we recognize
that many of the problems in defining the boundary
between deceptive and nondeceptive advertising remain to
be resolved, and we expect that the bar will have a special
role to play in assuring that advertising by attorneys flows
both freely and cleanly.
261
Once it is understood that many consumers of junk food "lack[]
sophistication 262 in relation to junk-food products in the same way
that the Court appears willing to see consumers lacking
sophistication with respect to legal services, then the same latitude
for the regulation of junk-food advertising will open up as the Court
has indicated would be available to the states in the regulation of
lawyer advertising. When approaching legal analysis from the
critical realist perspective, it becomes clear that we, that is, most
consumers, stand with respect to the power of market actors just as
vulnerably as legal clients have long been understood to stand with
respect to the power of lawyers.263 Social scientists have broadly
examined our intuitions about our own "sophistication" and where
those intuitions might actually pose special "risk[s] of deception."
264
There may be such a risk of deception in the market for junk food.265
The Court's reliance in the lawyer advertising cases on its own
expertise and experience as members of the legal community reveals
the Court's willingness to credit expertise in the determination of
whether or not an advertising practice is misleading. 266 Legislative
adoption of social scientific findings with respect to junk-food
261. Id. at 383-84.
262. Id.
263. See id. at 379.
264. Id. at 404.
265. There is substantial evidence, summarized supra Part II.B.1, that our
intuitive view of our own eating behavior is mistaken in ways that leave us
vulnerable to exploitive influence. See also Broken Scales, supra note 3, at
1675-82 (describing important counter-intuitive features of the human eating
system).
266. See generally Bates, 433 U.S. at 383 (reasoning that the public, in
contrast to legal professionals, lacked the sophistication necessary to realize
the significance of certain statements in legal advertising).
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consumption can provide that understanding.
267
To explore more deeply the contours of this jurisprudence,
consider another lawyer advertising case, Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel,268 which involved a lawyer's advertisement
seeking clients who may have been harmed by the infamous "Dalkon
Shield" intrauterine device. 269 The Court readily accepts the state's
assertion that the lawyer's advertisement-which stated that "if there
is no recovery, no legal fees are owed"-was misleading, and hence
could be banned! outright.270 Grappling within an area of its own
expertise, the Court does not need a social scientist to know which
way the wind blows:
The advertisement makes no mention of the distinction
between "legal fees" and "costs," and to a layman not aware
of the meaning of these terms of art, the advertisement
would suggest that employing appellant would be a no-lose
proposition in that his representation in a losing cause
would come entirely free of charge. The assumption that
substantial numbers of potential clients would be so misled
is hardly a speculative one: it is a commonplace that
members of the public are often unaware of the technical
meanings of such terms as "fees" and "costs"-terms that,
in ordinary usage, might well be virtually interchangeable.
When the possibility of deception is as self-evident as it is
in this case, we need not require the State to "conduct a
267. It is also possible to see some features of the Court's jurisprudence in
this area as relating more particularly to the substantial interest that people
have in obtaining access to information about the availability of legal services.
The Court repeatedly takes notice of the fact that many people often do not
pursue their legal rights because they do not know how to get a lawyer or how
much one will cost. Bates, 433 U.S. at 376. The interests at stake in the cases
are palpable. There is clearly a similarly substantial interest with respect to the
purchase and consumption of food, a basic and necessary consumer choice of
nearly every American, and one which also involves significant, though often
unseen, health risks.
268. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
269. The Dalkon Shield was a popular birth control device, introduced in the
early 1970s, which came to be associated with a myriad of serious health
problems, including birth defects and infertility. See generally MORTON
MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON
SHIELD (1985) (discussing corporate disregard for the harms associated with
the Dalkon Shield, in the interest of profit maximization).
270. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652.
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survey of the.., public before it [may] determine that the
[advertisement] had a tendency to mislead.*
271
And so the Court upheld the prohibition of lawyer advertising
that promised no "fees" were owed unless the client recovered. 272
The analysis was guided by the Court's learned appreciation of the
fact that consumer intuitions in the consumer context under review
may be misled by the advertising in ways a mere intuitive or
common sense understanding of the advertising would miss.273 The
analysis sanctifies the deployment of counterintuitive understanding
in the analysis of the constitutional status of commercial speech.
Also at issue in the case, however, was a state regulation
prohibiting the use of any illustrations in lawyer advertising. 274 The
Court overturned that prohibition, describing the drawing in the
defendant's advertisement as "an accurate representation of the
Dalkon Shield., 275 The Court touched on the subtler issues, raised
for the first time in this case, about the power of advertising in a way
that must be grappled with in any effort to ban junk-food advertising
to children:
The use of illustrations in advertising by attorneys, the State
suggests, creates unacceptable risks that the public will be
misled, manipulated, or confused. Abuses associated with
the visual content of advertising are particularly difficult to
police, because the advertiser is skilled in subtle uses of
illustrations to play on the emotions of his audience and
convey false impressions. Because illustrations may
produce their effects by operating on a subconscious level,
the State argues, it will be difficult for the State to point to
any particular illustration and prove that it is misleading or
manipulative. Thus... the State's argument is that its
purposes can only be served through a prophylactic rule.
276
The Court rejected the State's argument, but it is important to
see, it rejected it on empirical grounds-that is, on the grounds that
the State did not provide evidence, such as social scientific evidence,
271. Id. at 652-53 (internal citations omitted).
272. See id. at 653.
273. See id. at 652.
274. Id. at 633-34.
275. Id. at 647.
276. Id. at 648.
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in support of its argument concerning the power of illustrations in
lawyer advertising:
The State's arguments amount to little more than
unsupported assertions: nowhere does the State cite any
evidence or authority of any kind for its contention that the
potential abuses associated with the use of illustrations in
attorneys' advertising cannot be combated by any means
short of a blanket ban....
Thus, acceptance of the State's argument would be
tantamount to adoption of the principle that a State may
prohibit the iuse of pictures or illustrations in connection
with advertising of any product or service simply on the
strength of the general argument that the visual content of
advertisements may, under some circumstances, be
deceptive or manipulative. But ... broad prophylactic rules
may not be so lightly justified if the protections afforded
commercial speech are to retain their force. We are not
persuaded that identifying deceptive or manipulative uses of
visual media in advertising is so intrinsically burdensome
that the State is entitled to forgo that task in favor of the
more convenient but far more restrictive alternative of a
blanket ban on the use of illustrations.
277
In Zauderer, the government once again stipulated that the
advertising actually at issue in the case, including the illustration
used in the advertising, was not misleading. 278 The government,
therefore, was stuck arguing that the threat of misleading illustrations
in advertising was so great that it justified banning even the
assertedly nonmisleading advertisement that the Court had in front of
it.279 Such an argument is insufficient to rebut the dispositionist
intuitions that the Court is left to employ in its review of the
advertising prohibitions; such intuitions presume that information is
useful to consumers, not that it is manipulative. 280 It is little surprise
then that the state's abstract claims about the manipulative power of
illustrations in advertising were unavailing. The analysis, however,
277. Id. at 648-49 (emphasis added).
278. Id. at 634.
279. See id. at 649.
280. Id.
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might look very different upon the adoption of a critical realist view,
backed by social science, about how consumers actually respond to
different kinds of advertising with respect to particular services or
goods. The Court's own treatment of the "fees" and "costs" issue,
guided by its own casual empiricism in the specific area of legal
services, suggests availing precedent for such an analytic
endeavor.281
In Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of
Illinois,282 in reviewing the Illinois Supreme Court's sanctioning of
an attorney for using letterhead that the Illinois court deemed
misleading with respect to the lawyer's credentials, 283 the Court made
clear that it would "exercise de novo review" over a lower court's
holding that contested commercial speech was misleading,
281. My point in discussing Zauderer has been to suggest both the Court's
demand for, and its openness to, evidentiary support for prohibitions against
"misleading" methods of advertising that are counterintuitive or unfamiliar.
Nevertheless, lest Zauderer be thought to require too burdensome a showing
before a state may ban a method of advertising, it should be emphasized that it
was only after Zauderer that the Court first explicitly stated that, in the
commercial speech context, the least restrictive means are not required before
the Court would sanction a regulation furthering a substantial government
interest. See id. at 651-52 n.14. In Board of Trustees of the State University of
New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989), the Court clarified:
[W]hile we have insisted that "the free flow of commercial
information is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-
be regulators the costs of distinguishing... the harmless from the
harmful," we have not gone so far as to impose upon them the burden
of demonstrating that the distinguishment is 100% complete, or that
the manner of restriction is absolutely the least severe that will achieve
the desired end. What our decisions require is a "fit between the
legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends," a
fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable...
Id. at 480 (emphasis added) (omission in original).
282. 496 U.S. 91 (1990).
283. The letterhead stated that the lawyer was a "'Certified Civil Trial
Specialist-By the National Board of Trial Advocacy"' and "'Licensed [by]
Illinois, Missouri, and Arizona."' Id. at 96. The Illinois Supreme Court held
that the letterhead was unprotected by the First Amendment because it was
"'misleading,"' in that consumers "'could"' be led to believe that the attorney
was "'certified"' by some government agency and that such certification
"'tacitly attests"' to the lawyer's qualifications, when in fact the certification
came from a private organization with no government mandate or authority.
Id. at 98-99.
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positioning the issue squarely as one of law.2 84 In its de novo review
in Peel, the Court explicitly confirmed its previously-implicit view
that there is a jurisprudential presumption that "truthful, relevant
information ''285 is not misleading: "The Commission's concern about
the possibility of deception in hypothetical cases is not sufficient to
rebut the constitutional presumption favoring disclosure over
concealment. ,286 Where there is no factual evidence presented to
rebut that presumption, then the issue of whether or not advertising is
"misleading" must be decided only by judicial discretion-and where
hunches are decisive, the Court's hunches trump all others.287
Because no. evidence was presented to the contrary, the
presumption that the factually true statements in Peel's letterhead
were not misleading prevailed: "We reject the paternalistic
assumption that the recipients of petitioner's letterhead are no more
discriminating than the audience for children's television.... Given
the complete absence of any evidence of deception in the present
case, we must reject the contention that petitioner's letterhead is
actually misleading., 28 8  The Court's incantation of "paternalism"
here means something very different than does its use of the same
term in Virginia Pharmacy.2 8 9 In Virginia Pharmacy the Court used
the term to refer to the illegitimacy of the government's concern that
people would use truthful, nonmisleading information in a manner
contrary to their own best interests;290 here the concern is with the
characterization of whether people are in fact misled by information
or not. The former is normative, but the latter is positive, with
normative implications. Where the positive question is argued on
284. Id. at 108.
285. Id.
286. datIll.
287. See id. at 108-11.
288. Id. at 105-06. Applying its de novo review, the Peel Court found that
"the letterhead was neither actually nor inherently misleading." Id. at 110.
Relying again on its own knowledge and experience, the Court was "satisfied
that the consuming public understands that licenses [to drive cars, to operate
radio stations, to sell liquor] are issued by governmental authorities and that a
host of certificates [to commend job performance, to convey an educational
degree, to commemorate a solo flight or a hole in one] are issued by private
organizations." Id. at 103.
289. See supra Part III.A.2.
290. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 769-70 (1976).
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intuition, the Court is very willing to substitute its own judgment for
that of the government or the lower court that it is reviewing; but the
Court has nevertheless indicated a willingness to show deference to
actual findings by the government regarding what is misleading or
not.
291
Having glimpsed the Court's latent sensitivity to the situational
character in these lawyer-advertising cases, I return now to the
Court's assessment of Massachusetts's billboard tobacco advertising
ban in Lorillard. Again the government waived the first part of the
Central Hudson test and stipulated that the advertising it sought to
ban was not false or misleading. 292 Thus, the principle opinion had
no occasion to depart from the dispositionist presumptions at the
heart of the commercial speech doctrine, and no reason to examine
the advertising regulation at issue as doing anything other than
"imping[ing] on the speaker's ability to propose a commercial
transaction and the adult listener's opportunity to obtain information
about products."
293
Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in Lorillard, while calling
for the application of strict scrutiny and the abandonment of any
"commercial speech" category of First Amendment analysis,
provides a provocative suggestion for how government might build
the case for an advertising ban that could effectively respond to the
problem of unseen manipulation within advertisements and still pass
constitutional muster.294 After highlighting that Massachusetts had
waived the question of whether the prohibited advertising was false
291. Another lawyer advertising case, Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S.
466 (1988), for example, can be seen to signal the Court's appreciation that
"puffery" can be misleading in a way that may permit a legislature to regulate
the form and context, the situating of otherwise truthful, nondeceptive speech:
"To be sure, a[n] [advertisement] letter may be misleading if it unduly
emphasizes. trivial or 'relatively uninformative fact[s]."' Id. at 479. In
Shapero the Court remanded for a finding as to whether the emphasis at issue
in the advertising before it was "undue," and therefore "misleading." Id. at
479-80.
292. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001).
293. Id. at 565. Sensing that there might be something more subtle, and
possibly pernicious, happening in the tobacco advertising at issue, Justice
Stevens would have remanded the case for further development of the issues.
Id. The Court declines to do so because "the State had ample opportunity to
develop a record," and had not done so. Id.
294. Id. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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or misleading, Thomas chastised the state for nevertheless filling its
briefs with arguments about the misleading power of tobacco
advertising. 295 He then responded to the issue himself, with language
that may prove useful to the kind of advertising regulation I have in
mind:
Respondents suggest that tobacco advertising is misleading
because "its youthful imagery and... sheer ubiquity" leads
children to ?believe "that tobacco use is desirable and
pervasive." . [S]ee also Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae 7 ("[S]o many children lack the maturity in
judgment to resist the tobacco industry's appeals to
excitement, glamour, and independence"). This
justification is belied, however, by the sweeping
overinclusivity of the regulations. Massachusetts has done
nothing to target its prohibition to advertisements appealing
to "excitement, glamour, and independence"; the ban
applies with equal force to appeals to torpor, homeliness,
and servility.. It has not focused on "youthful imagery";
smokers depicted on the sides of buildings may no more
play shuffleboard than they may ride skateboards.
296
The tone is sardonic, but it should not be dismissed as
unserious-it reflects a theme that runs throughout the Court's
commercial speech jurisprudence. It suggests that a ban that focused
on promotional methods traditionally dismissed as mere "puffery," or
other methods that were unrelated to the perceived informational
value of commercial speech, would be constitutionally
permissible.2 97
This concept is undertheorized in existing case law. Part of the
work of this Article is to help flesh it out. Presently, incoherence
tends to emerge in the Court's efforts to span the profound gap
295. Id. at 578. In Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S.
357 (2002), the Court stated:
The dissent may... be suggesting that the Government has an interest
in banning the advertising of compounded drugs because patients who
see such advertisements will'be confused about the drugs' risks....
This argument is precluded, however, by the fact that the Government
does not argue that the advertisements are misleading.
Id. at 376.
296. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 578.
297. Id. at 571-90.
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between the core justification for protecting commercial speech, and
the reality of the unseen, manipulative power of much contemporary
commercial advertising. Thomas, for example, wrote:
[T]he State's apparent view [is] that the simple existence of
tobacco advertisements misleads people into believing that
tobacco use is more pervasive than it actually is. The State
misunderstands the purpose of advertising. Promoting a
product that is not yet pervasively used (or a cause that is
not yet widely supported) is a primary purpose of
advertising. Tobacco advertisements would be no more
misleading for suggesting pervasive use of tobacco products
than are any other advertisements that attempt to expand a
market for a product, or to rally support for a political
movement. Any inference from the advertisements that
businesses would like for tobacco use to be pervasive is
entirely reasonable, and advertising that gives rise to that
inference is in no way deceptive.298
While Thomas's characterization of "the State's apparent view"
of the situational power of advertising is incomplete, it is, once
again, not a bad start.299 His reply to the problem posed by that
view, however, is a non sequitur. That the advertising accomplishes
what the advertiser wants it to do-expand the market for its
product-is hardly evidence that it is not misleading, as Thomas
seems to argue. The idea that he started out criticizing was that
advertising, or the "sheer ubiquity" of tobacco advertising noted in
the previous quote from Thomas, misleadingly makes it look like
smoking is more prevalent than it actually is, and thus induces more
consumption of the product than it would if it were not misleading in
that fashion.3 °° Indeed, such an argument would be well supported
by social psychological findings with respect to human belief
formation. 30 1 But Thomas insists that the more reasonable inference
298. Id. at 578-79 (emphasis added).
299. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10 (employing Thomas's
summary take on the problem of childhood obesity).
300. See id.
301. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 21,
at 113-15 (discussing social psychology's findings regarding the "false
consensus" effect and "pluralistic ignorance," and the vulnerability to
manipulation that these processes suggest).
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is ... that tobacco advertisers or other advertisers want there to be
more consumption of their product than there currently is. 302 The
issue of the advertising being misleading is left sitting there, still
waiting for some comprehensive jurisprudential integration.
It is important at this juncture to make the point that although
the Court's presumption that truthful commercial speech is not
misleading is not fatal to the junk-food advertising ban proposed by
this Article, it is, nevertheless, a misguided presumption. The
presumption is neither theoretically nor empirically supported-it is
advanced by intuitive dispositionism and an under-theorized "anti-
paternalism. '30 3 Indeed, in light of the analysis in the foregoing
sections, it might seem that commercial speech should be considered
presumptively misleading, and thus presumptively subject to
regulation.
The core of the commercial speech doctrine rests on the
assumption that market actors respond to pre-existing consumer
preferences and that commercial speech facilitates the satisfaction of
those preferences. 30 4  In this Article, I have emphasized that
commercial speech in the form of mass-marketed advertising often
influences consumers in powerful ways that consumers do not
anticipate or appreciate, and that exercising such situational
influence can be extremely profitable to corporations. The Court
recognizes that commercial speech can remain robust even in the
face of aggressive regulation-the profit motive will find a way to
comport with the regulation and still be heard.30 5 For the very same
reason, corporate speech that is not regulated will discover and
comport with whatever methods of advertising will accomplish the
manipulation of the consumer in the most profitable fashion.
The very robustness of commercial speech should give rise to a
suspicion about the unseen power of such speech. When one begins
with the situational character, and appreciates the situational power
of advertising and the ability of powerful corporations to exercise
that power, the aiialysis suggests that if any presumption is adopted,
the presumption should be that the advertising will be misleading.
302. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 578-79.
303. Cf David Yosifon, Choice Fetishism and the Libertarian Paternalist
Imagination (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
304. See supra text accompanying notes 166-172.
305. See supra text accompanying notes 179-180.
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This presumption is also warranted because, as the analysis above
suggests, it will prove extremely difficult for dipositionist
individuals, governments, and courts to perceive the misleading
qualities of the advertising, and take issue with them.
30 6
2. Reconciling Posadas and 44 Liquourmart: Towards a Critical
Realist Understanding of the Commercial Speech Doctrine
Up to this point, my argument has been that where the Court
sees consumer behavior as reflecting individual, dispositional choice,
it rebuffs commercial speech regulation. Where it appreciates that
there are powerful situational influences on consumer behavior,
where behavior is or threatens to be misled by the advertising, rather
than the advertising abetting a consumer choice, regulation is
allowable. The Court clearly has a dispositionist prejudice: the
government has the burden of showing situational influence. 30 7 The
Court seems to recognize that in areas where its own expertise is
limited (perhaps all areas outside of the regulation of lawyers) the
government may be the authority on how consumers respond to
different types of advertising.30 8 Advocates of commercial speech
regulation have focused too heavily on the second part of the Central
Hudson test, to the detriment of a richer understanding of the
commercial speech doctrine-one capable of sustaining the ban I
propose.
In promulgating such a ban, it would be critical for government
to cease searching for legitimate reasons to suppress the effect of
advertising that the government admits is truthful and non-
misleading. That approach is too vulnerable to normative and
doctrinal cries of paternalism. The purpose and design of speech
regulation must instead be to ensure that advertising does not
overreach and manipulate consumers in ways they do not anticipate
or appreciate-such a purpose is much easier to justify and fits
within the Court's teachings. To enable such a regulatory project,
legal theory can show that much more of commercial speech is
misleading than mere intuition supposes, and that far less consumer
behavior reflects rational, dispositional behavior than is commonly
believed.
306. See supra text accompanying notes 198-200.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 238-239.
308. See supra Part III.B.1.
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With this aim in mind, I would like to address the widely shared
belief that the most recent commercial speech cases, such as 44
Liquormart and Lorillard, represent a clear ratcheting-up of
commercial speech protection on the part of the Court.319 I will
focus on the widely shared view of commentators that 44 Liquormart
overruled Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of
Puerto Rico,3 10 and expunged any remnants of that controversial
case, and its permissive posture towards commercial speech
regulation, from the Court's commercial speech jurisprudence.
Posadas was a 1986 decision that upheld a Puerto Rico law
forbidding all casino advertising to Puerto Rico residents by casinos
within Puerto Rico. 31 1 The law did not forbid casinos from directing
their advertising at non-resident tourists within or outside its
312territory.
As usual, the government did not argue that the advertising it
sought to restrict was false or misleading; instead the government
passed directly to claiming that the restriction nevertheless
accomplished a substantial government interest in reducing citizen
gambling in a sufficiently tailored fashion.313 I have argued that a
central vein running through the modem commercial speech cases,
from Virginia Pharmacy through 44 Liquormart, is that the
government may not suppress dispositional decision-making through
speech regulation. Posadas may thus seem anomalous, as most
commentators suggest. 314 Close examination of the case, however,
suggests that Posadas never really departed from this principle, and
further that Posadas actually reflects the imminent appreciation of
the situational character that I have suggested has always been a part
of the commercial speech doctrine. Under my analysis, Posadas,
309. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and
Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REv. 123
(concluding many Supreme Court Justices have begun to give commercial
speech close to full First Amendment protection).
310. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
311. Id. at 347-48.
312. Id. at 362 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
313. Id. at 342-43. Justice Stevens analyzed the Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection issues raised by Puerto Rico's ban. See id. at 359-63.
314. See Mitchell. N. Berman, Commercial Speech and the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine: A Second Look at "The Greater Includes the Lesser," 55
VAND. L. REv. 693 (2002) (summarizing academic critiques of Posadas).
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which the Court has never explicitly overruled, survives to aid the
junk-food advertising ban I propose, while 44 Liquormart would not
bar it.
Posadas can be reconciled with the central principle that the
First Amendment forbids suppression of truthful nonmisleading
speech for the purpose of repressing dispositional choice, if it is seen
that that despite the fact that the government did not argue the issue,
the Court appreciated that Puerto Rico actually sought to suppress
casino advertising because of its misleading influence, in powerful,
unseen ways, on Puerto Rico residents. 315 Writing for the Court,
Justice Rehnquist noted that "[t]he particular kind of commercial
speech at issue here, namely, advertising of casino gambling aimed
at the residents of Puerto Rico, concerns a lawful activity and is not
misleading or fraudulent, at least in the abstract."316  But in his
analysis, Justice Rehnquist leaves the abstract behind and speculates
about the reality of casino advertising:
Appellant contends ... that the First Amendment requires
the Puerto Rico Legislature to reduce demand for casino
gambling among the residents of Puerto Rico not by
suppressing commercial speech that might encourage such
gambling, but by promulgating additional speech designed
to discourage it. We reject this contention. We think it is
up to the legislature to decide whether or not such a
"counterspeech" policy would be as effective in reducing
the demand for casino gambling as a restriction on
advertising. The legislature could conclude, as it apparently
did here, that residents of Puerto Rico are already aware of
the risks of casino gambling, yet would nevertheless be
induced by widespread advertising to engage in such
315. On this reading, the only thing that was "wrong" with Posadas, from a
doctrinal standpoint, was its acceptance of a total advertising ban, not its
countenancing the Puerto Rican legislature's avowed purpose of reducing its
own citizens' casino gambling habits. Yet, the Court may have been moved in
some measure by the fact that Puerto Rico residents were no doubt aware of
the availability of casino gambling, due to all of the advertising directed at
tourists on the island. For a similar discussion regarding United States v. Edge
Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993), see infra text accompanying notes
325-332.
316. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 340-41
(1986) (emphasis added).
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potentially h~armful conduct.
317
Language such as this provides grounds for a jurisprudential
understanding that, while the core of the commercial speech doctrine
views advertising as proliferating information that enables
consumers to make informed, dispositionally driven choices, it also
appreciates that. other advertising might threaten to induce
consumption in a way that is not reflective of dispositional choice,
and which may be subject to regulation without offending
constitutional values. 318 Where the Court strikes down advertising
restrictions, it does so because it sees the restraint of free choice;
where regulation of advertising is allowed it is not because it is
thought that it is constitutionally permissible to interfere with free
choice, but, rather, because it is understood that choice is not at issue
at all, and what the regulation is doing is preventing inducement or
317. Id. at 344 (emphasis omitted) (emphasis added). Justice Rehnquist goes
on to cite Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc):
"We do not believe that a less restrictive time, place restriction, such as a
disclaimer warning of the dangers of alcohol, would be effective. The state's
concern is not that Fthe public is unaware of the dangers of alcohol .... The
concern instead is that advertising will unduly promote alcohol consumption
despite known dangers." Id. at 751 (emphasis added).
318. For example, consider a hypothetical casino advertising campaign
repeatedly showing a woman at a roulette table smiling widely, celebrating a
winning spin, the name and location of the casino appearing superimposed
over the image or images. If a legislature were to take notice of the fact that
humans tend to make probability assessments in terms of how easily examples
of particular outcomes come to mind, rather than by analyzing mathematical
fashion the actual likelihood of an outcome, then a legislature would be
justified in finding this hypothetical advertising campaign to be misleading
with respect to a gambler's chances of winning at roulette. See Hanson &
Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 21, at 67-71. What appears to
be unremarkable or unactionable puffery when one begins with a stylized
rational actor conception of human decision-making becomes highly
significant when one begins with a more truthful understanding of how humans
think. Nothing in the First Amendment requires Congress to patronize a
particular conception of the human mind when passing regulations to forbid
misleading commercial speech, which under most views of the First
Amendment is a permissible government purpose. See, e.g., In re R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (noting that states can prohibit misleading advertising).
This picture of the First Amendment gives credence to the Court's oft repeated
assurance that "if there be any danger that the people cannot evaluate...
information.., it is a. danger contemplated by the Framers of the First
Amendment." First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792
(1978); see infra Part IV (analyzing Bellotti).
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stimulation that has little to do with consumer choice.319  How
advertising will be viewed in a particular case depends strongly on
whether it is analyzed through a conceptual framework based in
intuition, or one steeped in social science.
This analysis also aids Rehnquist's otherwise dubious claim in
Posadas that Puerto Rico may impose its casino advertising ban
because "the greater power to completely ban casino gambling
necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino
gambling .... " 320 The Court had renounced that position in Virginia
Pharmacy; indeed, the falsity of that view with respect to
commercial speech is the whole point of the modem commercial
speech doctrine. But Rehnquist's statement, read as part of the
"inducement" argument I am highlighting here, evades the tangles of
the Court's unconstitutional conditions doctrine altogether. 321
Justice Rehnquist wrote:
It would.., surely be a strange constitutional doctrine
which would concede to the legislature the authority to
totally ban a product or activity, but deny to the legislature
the authority to forbid the stimulation of demand for the
product or activity through advertising on behalf of those
who would profit from such increased demand.322
Rehnquist's argument here rests on a very different conception
319. Compare Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 565 (2001)
(striking down advertising restrictions that prevented adults from obtaining
information about legal products), with Posadas, 478 U.S. at 348 (upholding
ban on the advertising of gambling casinos aimed at Puerto Rico residents).
320. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345-46.
321. The Court later explicitly repudiates the "greater power includes the
lesser" argument as applied to the regulation of commercial speech. See 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 513 (1996):
Even though government is under no obligation to provide a person,
or the public, a particular benefit, it does not follow that conferral of
the benefit may be conditioned on the surrender of a constitutional
right.... Thus, just as it is perfectly clear that Rhode Island could not
ban all obscene liquor ads except those that advocated temperance, we
think it equally: clear that its power to ban the sale of liquor entirely
does not include a power to censor all advertisements that contain
accurate and nonmisleading information about the price of the
product.
Id.; see also Berman, supra note 314, at 726-30 (explaining the "greater power
including the lesser" doctrine).
322. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 346 (emphasis added).
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of the relationship between advertising and human behavior than that
reflected in the downward-sloping demand curve trope of Virginia
Pharmacy, but it does not rest on a different view of what is
permissible in commercial speech regulation.32 3  Rehnquist's
argument is one that sees the consumer as a situational character, one
vulnerable to "the stimulation of demand 3 24 that could be
accomplished through the unseen influence of advertising. This
figure, I have been arguing, while usually in the background, is no
stranger to the Court's commercial speech jurisprudence. The
government may not regulate speech where doing so interferes with
dispositional choice; what it may do, however, is regulate
commercial speech that merely "stimulates" demand for the product
by exercising situational influence over vulnerable situational
characters. A similar view is evident in United States v. Edge
Broadcasting Co.,325 a post-Posadas case in which the Court upheld
a federal statute forbidding radio stations located in states that
prohibited lotteries from broadcasting advertisements for lotteries,
even if the advertisements concerned lotteries in adjacent states.
326
The majority sustained 
the total ban.
327
In Edge, the state once again waived the first step of the Central
Hudson analysis. Thus, the Court again did not squarely analyze the
potential falsity or misleading nature of the proscribed advertising.
Nevertheless, in considering the second part of the Central Hudson
test, whether the ban was narrowly tailored to accomplish the state's
asserted interest in curbing lottery consumption, the Court again
revealed a sensitivity to the situational character, and an appreciation
that commercial speech might mislead consumers in powerful,
unseen ways that are not entitled to constitutional protection. This is
not fully articulated in the Court's opinion, but read closely its
analysis is fascinating.
323. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
324. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 346.
325. 509 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1993). The newly appointed Chief Justice John
Roberts was on the brief for the government as Deputy Solicitor General in
support of the constitutionality of the statute. Brief for Petitioners, United
States v. Edge Broad. Co., No. 92-486 (1993).
326. Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 432-33.
327. See id.
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At a crucial 'point in Edge, the Court turns to the radio station's
claim that the regulation should be struck because the ban was not fit
to serve, and did not serve, the purpose that the state claimed for it.
328
The radio station argued that consumers living at the northern tip of
North Carolina, where the station at issue was broadcasting, were
inevitably apprised of the fact that there was a lottery going on just
across the border in Virginia, how much it cost to play, where tickets
could be bought, etc.329 Consumers learned such information from
advertising circulating from Virginia into North Carolina, and they
even heard about it on their radios while listening to radio stations
broadcasting from Virginia.330 The Court rejected this argument and
provocatively, if incompletely, recognized that advertising may
affect listeners in ways unrelated to informing dispositional
choice. 331  The Court seemed to appreciate that the constant
repetition of advertising might have some other effect on consumers
that a legislature could remedy without violating the First
Amendment:
Even if all of the residents of Edge's North Carolina service
area listen to lottery ads from Virginia stations, it would
still be true !that 11% of radio listening time in that area
would remain free of such material. If Edge is allowed to
advertise the Virginia lottery, the percentage of listening
time carrying such material would increase from 38% to
49%. We do not think that Central Hudson compels us to
consider this consequence to be without significance.
332
328. Id. at 429. If the regulation did not advance the asserted government
interest it would be restricting commercial speech for no good reason, and
would fail the Central Hudson test. See supra Part III.A.2.
329. Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 431-33.
330. Id. at 418.
331. Id. at 435.
332. Id. at 432-33. Edge Broadcasting is another good case illustrating the
Court's concern about total bans; it seems that one of the reasons that the Court
upholds the prohibition is because citizens are otherwise exposed to
information about the lottery, so the intuitive downward-sloping demand curve
tale can be satisfied. Indeed, under the analysis advanced here, the fact that
residents of North Carolina are apprised of the existence of the lottery and on
what terms participation may be had, would cut in favor of North Carolina's
regulation-it seems doubtful that the Court would have sustained the ban if its
effect were to keep North Carolina residents entirely ignorant of the fact that
there are lotteries in Virginia.
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There is something about the "consequence" of being exposed to
eleven percent more lottery advertising that is allowed to matter in
the commercial speech doctrine. There is something in this
"consequence" that the government permissibly sought to remedy
when it "legislated on the premise that the advertising of gambling
serves to increase the demand for the advertised product.... even if
the North Carolina audience is not wholly unaware of the lottery's
existence."
333
Without passing at least intermediate-and for some justices,
strict scrutiny3 4 -the government may not prevent the dissemination
of truthful, nondeceptive, nonmisleading information about lawful
activities. It apparently may never prohibit truthful nonmisleading
commercial speech for the purpose of retarding dispositional choice.
But in truth, nobody ever really argues that the First Amendment
countenances the use of speech regulation to suppress free choice on
the paternalistic grounds that people make bad choices when
presented with truthful, nonmisleading speech. Rather, as my
treatment of the cases has argued, the government's concern is
usually, at heart, that the advertising is powerfully misleading in
ways consumers do not appreciate.
The structure of the Central Hudson test de-emphasizes the
inquiry about the false or misleading nature of commercial speech.
However, as I have argued, the Court has recognized that the
government has discretion to determine what kind of advertising is
misleading, and in certain circumstances may conclude that whole
333. Id. at 434. Such a premise would find support both in social science
and corporate practice. The "mere exposure effect" is a well-documented
phenomenon in social psychology that refers to the fact that merely being
exposed to a particular stimulus will influence subjects' subsequent
preferences for the stimulus, even where they have no conscious awareness
that they had been previously exposed to it. For example, subjects exposed to
pictograms at a rate too rapid for them to consciously notice, will later prefer
the pictogram they were exposed to over one that they had never been exposed
to. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 21, at 44-
50. Contemporary commercial advertising campaigns bear witness to
corporate understanding of this phenomenon. See, e.g., Rachel Deahl, Get 'Em
While They're Young: Do Chains Change How Students Think About
Bookstores, BOOK STANDARD, July 1, 2005, http://www.thebookstandard.com/
bookstandard/news/retail/articledisplay.isp?vnucontentid=1000972711.
334. Chief Justice Roberts's support for Central Hudson as Deputy Solicitor
General, see supra note 325, probably yields little insight into how he will
approach the commercial speech doctrine as a jurist.
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methods of advertising are misleading. The government will stand
on firmer ground in this respect when it relies on contemporary
social science, in particular social psychology, which suggests that
far more of contemporary advertising may rightly be called
"misleading" than may be intuitively suspected under a common
sense, intuitively grounded conception of human decision-making.
One of the reasons that the commercial speech doctrine is
underdeveloped is because government has not embraced a satisfying
theoretical justification for the restrictions it seeks to impose.
Government interest in curbing the misleading and exploitive power
of advertising requires a steady commitment to the critical analysis
of commercial speech and to the nature of human agency.
Dispositionism cannot provide the necessary theoretical under-
pinnings for an ;effective and justifiable approach to commercial
speech regulation, leaving such efforts vulnerable to the cries of
paternalism and "mind control0 3 5 that are used by critics of such
regulation to influence jurists, legislatures and legal theorists. My
argument endeavors not only to deepen understanding of the
possibilities of the commercial speech doctrine, but also to provide a
deeper understanding of the purposes of commercial speech
regulation.
3. Tombstone Elues-Banning Junk-Food Advertising to Children
The problem with junk-food advertising, as I described in the
previous section, is that it influences consumers' thoughts and
behaviors in powerful ways that they do not anticipate or appreciate.
These influences may be highly detrimental, or even deadly. Earlier
I explored this reality through an inquiry into the power of "puffing"
to influence consumption in ways that consumers, contemporary
regulatory regimes, and the common law do not appreciate, and
which has therefore long gone unregulated.336 The tombstone blues
is a proposal aimed at prohibiting tactics such as "puffing," and other
powerful, unnamed methods of influence, in the advertising of junk-
food products to children. The proposal comports with the
commercial speech doctrine, as this Article has thus far analyzed
it.337
•335. See Redish, supra note 153, at 639.
336. See supra Part II.C.2.
337. These arguments easily support a refashioning of the puffery doctrine in
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The commercial speech doctrine will not sustain an absolute ban
on all advertising. Where a regulation bans all commercial speech
regarding a legal product or service, a central justification for
allowing greater regulation in the commercial speech context-the
robustness of commercial speech and the wherewithal of commercial
enterprises to get valuable speech out in ways other than that
prohibited by government regulation-is no longer in play.
338
Without the robustness justification, review of total bans approaches
the strict scrutiny standard that the Court applies to regulation of
non-commercial speech.339  Further, an absolute advertising ban
necessarily includes a ban on price advertising, providing an easy
opportunity to exercise the core dispositionist script concerning the
relationship between markets, advertising, and consumer behavior,
which resides at the heart of the commercial speech doctrine.
340
Thus, the tombstone blues is not a complete ban. The Court's
jurisprudence instead counsels in favor of a near complete ban, but
one that still allows advertising in a limited, highly prescribed
tombstone format. Junk-food advertising would be limited to a brief
description or picture of the product, its price, information about
where it can be purchased and basic nutritional information. The
tombstone blues approach insures that useful information is produced
and circulated, while it restricts the kind of manipulation that
corporations use freely under the present regulatory framework. It
makes good on the central promise of the commercial speech
doctrine to endow the information proliferating power of commercial
regards to advertising directed at children; I will argue that they support a
general refashioning of the puffery doctrine. As the social science reviewed
earlier makes clear, children do not distinguish between statements of fact and
sales-pitch "boasting." Story & French, supra note 74, at 3. Nevertheless, for
reasons explored earlier and reiterated here, I believe that an effective ban of
junk-food advertising to children requires banning nearly all such advertising
to adults as well. Thus, I examine the constitutional viability of a near total
ban on junk-food advertising to adults. See supra text accompanying notes
150-163.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 222-223.
339. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502 (1996)
("[N]either the 'greater objectivity' nor the 'greater hardiness' of truthful,
nonmisleading commercial speech justifies reviewing its complete suppression
with added deference.").
340. See supra Part III.A.2.
RESISTING DEEP CAPTURE
speech with First Amendment protection, 341 because it only bans
non-informational content. While some valuable speech may be
curbed by a tombstone blues ban, the sacrifice is marginal in light of
the grave social problem it may help solve.
342
The federal government's traditionally strict limitation on
advertising to promote a public offering of securities is an example
of the kind of ban I propose. 343 Prior to SEC approval of a public
offering's registration statement, written advertisements 344 of the
proposed sale have, until very recently, been limited to what was
known as a "tombstone" format that did "no more than identify the
security, state the price thereof, state by whom orders will be
executed, and contain such other information as the [SEC] ... may
permit."345 No other written advertising of the securities, let alone
341. N.Y. Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
342. But see Zywicki et al., supra note 76.
343. See generally Aleta G. Estreicher, Securities Regulation and the First
Amendment, 24 GA. L. REV. 223 (1990) (providing a comprehensive analysis
of the relationship between the commercial speech doctrine and federal
securities regulation). In December of 2005, the SEC implemented significant
reforms in its regulation of securities offerings. E.g., Securities Act of 1933,
17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (2005); see also FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS, SHRIVER &
JACOBSON LLP, MEMORANDUM TO OUR FRIENDS AND CLIENTS, SECURITIES
OFFERING REFORM: A SYNOPSIS (2005), http://www.ffhsj.com/cmemos/
050822%20securities_%20offering%20reform.pdf (summarizing the new
rules regarding communications in a public offering of securities, as well as
providing some comparison to the old rules). While the December 2005
amendments may undercut to some degree the utility of the federal regulation
of securities advertising as a living example of the kind of regulatory regime I
am arguing would be wise and viable for junk-food advertising, the securities
regime as it existed prior to the amendments nevertheless remains a useful
programmatic and justificatory touchstone for my project. It remains to be
seen what effect the December 2005 amendments will have on consumer
protection concerns in the securities market.
344. The securities rules use "[t]he term 'prospectus' [that] means any
prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication, written or
by radio or television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of
any security." 15 U.S.C. § 77b (a)(10) (1982).
345. Id. "[N]o promotion of an upcoming [public] offering is possible until
the registration statement, including the preliminary prospectus, has been filed
for review with the SEC. As originally conceived, the 'waiting period,"'
which is the period of time after the registration statement and preliminary
prospectus have been filed for SEC review, but before the registration
statement passed SEC review and becomes effective, "was intended to enable
the agency to preclear the registration statement." Estreicher, supra note 343,
at 281. So, during this waiting period, the company that is issuing securities
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puffing, was permitted in the period before SEC approval of the
proposed sale, out of fear that consumers might be misled concerning
the true value of the security that would ultimately be issued.
346
After the required registration statement was declared "effective" by
the SEC, making the securities ripe for sale, the securities could be
marketed more extensively, though only if preceded or accompanied
by a prospectus, the form and content of which is prescribed by
statute.
347
and its financial intermediaries "are prohibited from engaging in direct writing
campaigns or any media advertising. [The intermediaries] can, however,
utilize their substantial lists of established customers to advertise orally,
conditioning the market and attempting to solicit offers to buy through
personal telephone calls throughout the waiting period." Id. at 280-81.
346. See Estreicher, supra note 345, at 281-82. The December 2005
amendments significantly expand, though still limit, the kind of information
that can be provided in tombstone advertising. Securities Act of 1933, 17
C.F.R. § 230.134 (now permitting, inter alia, statements concerning the nature
of the firm's business, final maturity and interest rate provisions on fixed
income securities, descriptions of offering procedures, and expected rating
agencies). The recent liberalization of Rule 134 still describes a highly limited
advertising regime (especially as compared to, for example, contemporary
junk-food advertising), and remains backed by the fundamental concern that
consumers of securities are vulnerable to overreaching on the part of sellers.
In the securities context, the tombstone advertising limitation is meant to lead
potential consumers to inquire further about the security by asking for a copy
of the highly detailed prospectus that fully describes the offering. See
Estreicher, supra note 343, at 280. The tombstone blues regime would
incorporate the same approach, allowing, indeed requiring, junk-food
promoters to maintain a highly specific and detailed "prospectus" regarding the
food they sell. Incorporating the "prospectus" into the tombstone blues
approach provides cover against the Court's instruction that "the States may
not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading
information.., if the information also may be presented in a way that is not
deceptive... ." In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
347. Estreicher, supra note 343, at 282. The December 2005 amendments
provide greater leeway for firms to "free write," that is, to promote their
securities without the required accompaniment of a prospectus, as long as the
prospectus is made available to consumers who may desire to inspect it.
Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (2005). Free writing is, of course,
still subject to the strong anti-fraud provisions otherwise embodied in the
securities laws. See Securities Offering Reform, SEC Release No. 33-8591
(Dec. 1, 2005) (adopting release), at 148. Such provisions do not admit of the
kind of puffery that is sanctioned in less regulated markets, such as the junk-
food market. As one leading treatise put it, the puffing doctrine in the
securities regulation context "has all but gone the way of the dodo." 7 Louis
Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3424 (3d. ed. 1991). But
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This familiar system of regulating the promotion and sale of
securities provides a very powerful example of extensive
governmental limitations on advertising which, at least until very
recently, were widely viewed as entirely appropriate.3 48  Nothing
about the reforms implemented by the SEC in 2005 suggests that the
previous regime was impermissible; indeed, in promulgating its
reforms the SEC was responding to perceived efficiency concerns,
not constitutional pressures.349 Justifications traditionally advanced
for curbing commercial speech in the securities area are at least as
applicable to food advertising to children; most importantly, the
relative un-sophistication of the consumer vis-A-vis the seller, and the
vast disparities in their relative access to information. 310 It took a
major social crisis-the Great Depression-before the justifications
see Jennifer O'Hare, The Resurrection of the Dodo: The Unfortunate Re-
Emergence of the Puffery Defense in Private Securities Fraud Actions, 59
OHIO ST. L.J. 1697 (1998) (arguing that while the federal securities laws
clearly indicate a congressional desire to eclipse conventional puffery
defenses, courts have nevertheless afforded defendants too liberal an
opportunity to make use of this defense).
348. See Estreicher, supra note 343. Indeed, the recent liberalizing reforms
adopted by the SEC were spurred by efficiency concerns, not Constitutional
pressures. See Securities Offering Reform, SEC Release No. 33-8591, at 297
(Dec. 1, 2005); Securities Offering Reform, SEC Release No. 33-8501 (Nov. 3,
2004) (proposing release). As an aside, consider the relative power of those
who benefit from extensive government regulation of securities promotion-
relatively affluent members of society who are able to actively trade in the
securities market-against the relative poverty and powerlessness of those who
suffer disproportionately the ill effects of what I have argued are misleading,
yet unregulated, junk-food advertisements.
349. The SEC's: defense of its reforms makes no mention of First
Amendment concerns. See, e.g., Securities Offering Reform, SEC Release No.
33-8591. Comments to the SEC on the proposed reforms prior to their
adoption did not appear to make First Amendment arguments either. See SEC,
Comments on Proposed Rule: Securities Offering Reform, http://www.sec.gov/
rules/proposed/s73804.shtml (visited on Dec. 20, 2005) (collecting comments
to the SEC on its proposed, now adopted, reforms).
350. See Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws:
Opting Out of Securities Regulation by Private Agreement, 56 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 519, 533-39 (1999) (discussing the history, purpose, and scope of the
securities laws). See generally 2 J. S. ELLENBERGER & ELLEN P. MAHAR,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (1973) (stating that the general purpose of the
legislation is to protect the public and provide the public with complete
information regarding securities transactions).
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for pervasive regulation of securities became clear.35 1 The obesity
epidemic is this generation's major social crisis that should make the
justifications for regulating the junk-food market clear. The
expansive definition of a "misleading" statement from the securities
arena can be exploited to develop extensive, but constitutionally
viable, limitations on fast food advertising.
352
351. Estreicher, supra note 343, at 291.
352. In his analysis of hypothetical tobacco advertising regulatory regimes,
Professor Redish concludes that a tombstone approach would run afoul of the
First Amendment. Redish, supra note 153, at 638. Redish's argument against
tombstone advertising is no different than his general argument against
advertising bans; he uncritically presumes that the prohibited advertising is
comprised of "persuasive appeals" rather than misleading speech, and then
concludes that the paternalistic purpose behind prohibiting such appeals cannot
be countenanced. Id. at 627. Redish stretches his basic idea about speaker
interests:
[A] speaker's ability to choose the manner of expression should not be
viewed as uniquely tied to the speaker's developmental interest, but to
the listener's free speech rights as well. In the case of tombstone
limitations, restrictions on the speaker's ability to choose the method
of expression derive from the same unacceptable paternalistic
concerns that underlie a total ban: the fear that the public will be
induced, on the basis of persuasive appeals, to engage in a lawful
activity because the government does not trust the public's ability to
make judgments on the basis of those appeals.
Id. (emphasis added).
The tombstone blues approach, however, is motivated not by a paternalistic
purpose, but by a concern that junk-food advertising is powerfully misleading.
Cf supra text accompanying note 348 (observing that the SEC adopted a
tombstone approach because securities advertising could mislead consumers
about the value of the security). Tombstone advertising limits would curtail
the misleading effects of junk-food advertising while protecting First
Amendment values. Redish assumes away the possibility that the banned
advertising is false -or misleading, thus does not thoroughly address how to
analyze that question. See id. Redish uses intuition and dispositionism to
quickly move on: "Bluntly put," he writes, "prohibition of tobacco advertising
constitutes a governmental exercise in mind control of its citizens-hardly a
course of action consistent with the... First Amendment right of free
expression." Id. at 639. This is an easy argument to make and a comfortable
conclusion to reach when you are content to believe that the only way to
exercise "mind control" is by restricting speech. But, if "mind control" is on
the table as a concern, then the power of misleading speech to exercise "mind
control" should be a dire theoretical and programmatic concern; a concern that
cannot be solved through "blunt" conclusions about what tobacco advertising
prohibitions might accomplish.
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So why stop at a junk-food advertising ban-what is the limiting
principle in a project such as this? The limitations of the inquiry are
bound by the requirements of the commercial speech doctrine and
the First Amendment, the limitations of empirical inquiry, and by
theoretical imagination. This Article's conclusions have been
reached through a critical realist exploration of the constitutional
permissibility of a near-total ban on junk-food advertising to
children. Critical realism does not promise, and does not provide,
deductively applicable answers to every legal problem, as some
approaches purport to do. Nor does critical realism stagnate in
analytic indeterminacy, as other approaches are sometimes said to
do. Nothing in the foregoing analysis should be read to suggest that
the government has, or should have, plenary authority to regulate
speech, or even commercial speech.
The human suffering wrought by the obesity epidemic is
palpable. 353 This suffering gives rise to a suspicious inquiry into the
junk-food marketplace, and junk-food advertising in particular,
which has led to this Article's conclusions. An analysis of the
consumer market in blue jeans, or the consumer market in concrete,
or in mortgages, might reach different conclusions. Blue jeans
advertisements, for example, use puffing strategies similar to those
of junk-food advertisements. Yet the absence of dramatic increases
in heart disease and kidney failure, diabetes, and premature death
associated with the over-consumption of blue jeans may suggest that
its advertising is not misleading in the same way as junk-food
advertising; i.e. with respect to the health problems associated with
the consumption.
I have not argued that puffery is inherently misleading speech,
even in commercial advertising, nor does my argument inexorably
lead to such a conclusion. Puffery may enable the exploration and
expansion of the possibilities of individual or collective identity
formation through, for example, the consumption of blue jeans
endowed with a' cool expression of human flourishing through
creative discursive practices in its commercial advertising.354 The
353. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64; see also Broken Scales,
supra note 3, at 1649-52 (describing the health problems and social costs
associated with overweight and obesity).
354. See generally PETER N. STEARNS, AMERICAN COOL: CONSTRUCTING A
TWENTIETH CENTURY EMOTIONAL STYLE (1994) (providing a social history of
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enormous power of commercial speech to advance such exploration
is both a reason to grant commercial speech constitutional protection
and a reason to keep a close eye on its power to mislead consumers.
My argument has stayed within the Court's commercial speech
jurisprudence, even as it has attempted to creatively expand it. There
are particular kinds of products and consumer markets that are highly
susceptible to powerfully manipulative advertising campaigns; the
junk food for children market is one of them. My analysis honors
and advances the incrementalism and caution found in the Court's
First Amendment jurisprudence.
Still, my suspicious inquiry cannot keep from rousing another
kind of suspicion protecting First Amendment interests: the concern
that the arguments advanced here may be applied not just to
legitimate commercial speech regulation, but also to legitimate the
regulation of political and social speech in a manner that threatens
core First Amendment values and perhaps even freedom itself. The
manipulative power of political speech is, indeed, both evident and
analytically troubling to the foundations of classical liberalism-it is
a profound problem that cannot be ignored. While it is beyond the
scope of this article to fully analyze or respond to that problem, the
the emergence of "cool" as an innovative emotional style that responded to,
and advanced, modem alterations in work and social patterns). An important
body of work in First Amendment scholarship has been dedicated to analyzing
the centrality and impact of non-informational discursive practices in
commercial advertising, and the evident disparity between "the eighteenth-
century first amendment, with it's emphasis on serious public discourse" and
the "first-amendment triviality" wrought by "the self-indulgent bent of mass
entertainment culture." Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The First
Amendment in an Age of Paratroopers, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1087, 1116 (1990).
For an excellent discussion of the First Amendment, see also RONALD K.L.
COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE (2d ed. 2005). My
project, while similar in broad orientation to this tradition, also departs from it
in significant ways. The critical realist approach advances through a
framework more deeply steeped in social scientific and economic analysis than
is witnessed in the less formal, autoschediastic "cultural approach" of scholars
such as Collins and Skover. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Pissing
in the Snow: A Cultural Approach to the First Amendment, 45 STAN. L. REV.
783, 785 (1993). As is suggested by my statement in the text provisionally
distinguishing between concerns presented by junk-food advertising and those
presented by blue jeans advertising, my approach is also less concerned with
broad critiques of the "triviality" of modem commercial culture than it is with
the power of modern advertising to mislead consumers in a manner cognizable
within the modern commercial speech doctrine.
590
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next Part, which is necessary to the advancement of the tombstone
blues project, begins a critical realist approach to it.
IV. RETHINKING "COMMON SENSE DISTINCTIONS": THE PROBLEM OF
DEEP CAPTURE AND A CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE RESPONSE
TO IT
While one may impugn the motive of corporate commentary
on matters of public concern, it is much harder to morph the
content of such commentary itself.3"'
-Rodney Smolla
One of the principle ways that the food industry has attempted to
avoid responsibility for the harms associated with the obesity crisis is
by arguing that even if over-consumption of its products causes
obesity, it is consumers who are responsible for the outcome, since
the industry is only responding to, and not inducing, consumer
demand.356 The food industry promotes this view of consumer
behavior to courts, government, legal theorists, and to consumers
themselves. Indeed, much corporate speech is dedicated to the
promotion of dispositionism, which, it turns out, is an extremely
effective strategy in the court of public opinion, and in government.
In my previous work with Hanson, we call this process "deep
capture." 357
Certainly dispositionism is promoted through conventional
product advertising. 358 But "deep capture" is pursued in many other
ways as well. A full elaboration of such methods is beyond the
scope of this Article, but one illustrative example that my co-authors
and I featured in Broken Scales was the food industry's financing of
"issue advocacy" groups that do not shill corporate products directly,
but instead actively promote-to consumers and regulators-the
dispositionist conception of human agency on which maximal profit
355. Smolla, supra note 124, at 1287.
356. See Broken Scales, supra note 3, at 1797-98 (exploring this argument
in the context of the obesity epidemic); Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation,
supra note 21, at 249-50 (explaining the basic form of this argument).
357. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 21, at 202-20
(describing the deep capture hypothesis); see also supra text accompanying
note 58 (describing deep capture).
358. See Broken Scales, supra note 3, at 1709-11 (describing the promotion
of dispositionism in conventional advertising; e.g., "You asked for, you got it!"
(Toyota), "Have it your way!" (Burger King), etc.).
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thrives. 3 59 Consider, for example, an outfit known as The Center for
Consumer Freedom, a corporate-funded organization dedicated to
"promoting personal responsibility and protecting consumer
choices." 360 One way this organization seeks to advance its purpose
is through print and broadcast advertising.36 1 For example, a print
advertising campaign promulgated by the group presents a picture of
a dangling belt; the caption above the belt reads in large letters:
"Common Sense Obesity Warning." 362 Below the belt (so to speak),
the ad reads: "At the Center for Consumer Freedom, we think adults
are smart enough to choose what to eat and when to move. The only
warnings you really need are about food cops, bureaucrats, and trial
lawyers." 363 This organization also produces radio, television and
Internet advertising campaigns with similar themes.
3 64
For corporations to be funding this kind of advertising, it must
be important to their bottom line, and it must be working. 365 Thus,
359. See id. at 1747-48.
360. The Center for Consumer Freedom, About Us http://www.
consumerfreedom.com/about.cfm (last visited Jan. 31, 2006); see also Broken
Scales, supra note 3, at 1742-43 (elaborating on this organization's role in
combating junk food regulation); Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note
21, at 249-50 (discussing this organization);.
361. See The Center for Consumer Freedom, http://www.consumerfreedom.
com (last visited Aug. 18, 2005).
362. Id. (follow "Ad Campaigns" hyperlink; then follow "Print Ads"
hyperlink; then select advertisement number 14). In the smaller print of the
advertisement, the notches of the belt are labeled as if to indicate the occasion
on which the belt was expanded; they read, serially: "The Sopranos, Season
Three," "Wife's Lasagna," "Bought Sony PlayStation," and "Hired Lawn
Service." The Center for Consumer Freedom, Common Sense, Obesity
Warning, http://www.consumerfreedom.com/images/ads/fullsize/print_
obesity belt.jpg (last visited Jan. 31, 2006). The humor is part of how the
advertisement works. But notice the complete absence of any mention of junk
food, let alone junk-food advertising. Id. Interestingly, the advertisement is
sponsored by the food and restaurant industry and yet there is no mention of
their food in this advertisement's discourse on the causes of obesity.
363. Center for Consumer Freedom, Print Ads, http://www.
consumerfreedom.com/advertisementsdetail.cfm/ad/22 (last visited Jan. 31,
2006).
364. See The Center for Consumer Freedom, Home, http://www.
consumerfreedom.com (last visited Aug. 18, 2005) (describing these
campaigns). I
365. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 21, at 277 n.523
(analyzing the importance of staged financing in ensuring that institutions
supported by corporate money indeed serve the corporate purpose).
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such deep capture efforts pique the analytic impulse at work in the
previous sections, which were concerned with the misleading power
of conventional product advertising. However, this kind of speech,
which is social and political in nature, may lay claim to greater First
Amendment protection than that afforded the conventional
commercial speech analyzed above. In Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Product Corp.,366 the Court held that pamphlets circulated through
the mail by a manufacturer of contraceptives constituted commercial
speech, and thus 'would be analyzed under the intermediate scrutiny
standard of Central Hudson.367 That the pamphlets, in addition to
promoting the name of the company's product, provided important
non-commercial information regarding sexually transmitted diseases,
did not compel a stricter standard: "A company has the full panoply
of protections available to its direct comments on public issues, so
there is no reason for providing similar constitutional protection
when such statements are made in the context of commercial
transactions. '" 368  There are two challenging principles in this
holding. The first is that companies enjoy full First Amendment
protection when speaking on social or political issues. 369 The second
is that the Court seems to be saying that one of the reasons that it
allows the government greater latitude when it comes to regulating
purely commercial speech is because social and political speech by
the same commercial speakers would be entitled to the "full panoply"
of First Amendment protections, so there is no threat to such
speech.37°
These conclusions, however, are only the point of departure for
inquiring into the permissibility of regulating deep capture
advertising; it is not the end of the inquiry. The Court's oft-repeated
claim, cited from Bolger, that companies are entitled to the "full
panoply" of First Amendment protections when speaking on political
and social issues,371 at least as applied to corporate speech, is an
exaggeration of its own jurisprudence on the issue. In my view, the
366. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
367. See id. at 68 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980)).
368. Id.
369. Id. at 69.
370. Id. at 68.
371. See id.
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Court's actual jurisprudence in this area is sufficient, analytically and
normatively, to sustain the regulation of corporate deep capture
advertising.
In a formative case in 1978, First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti,372 the Court reviewed a Massachusetts statute that forbade
corporations from expending corporate funds to influence any public
referenda that did not bear materially on its business.373  The
Massachusetts legislature passed the statute after corporate funds had
been spent fighting several successive failed public referenda seeking
to amend the state Constitution to allow for graduated personal
income taxes. 374  The statutory prohibition included a provision
specifying that any referenda on personal income taxes was to be
considered immaterial to the business of any bank or business
corporation.375 Prior to Bellotti, the Court had already held that it
was within the government's power to limit corporate campaign
donations to particular candidates for public office. 376 Insulating the
political system from the intimation of corruption that accompanies
such financing was viewed as sufficient justification for the
limitation on political contributions, even under a strict scrutiny
standard.377  But in Bellotti, the Court declined to extend that
reasoning to allow the government to forestall campaign financing
by corporations in public referenda. 378 The Court simply found that
the corporate funding of referendum campaigns does not emit as
coarse a stench of political corruption as does corporate financing of
individual campaigns.
379
As in the conventional commercial speech cases, the Court does
not approach its analysis from the perspective of the corporate
speaker, but rather, from the perspective of listener interests: "The
372. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
373. Id. Bellotti was decided as the Court forged the modem commercial
speech doctrine in cases like Virginia Pharmacy and Bates. Bellotti itself is
thus a crucial pillar in modem commercial speech jurisprudence, broadly
construed.
374. Id. at 769.
375. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp, 1977).
376. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786-87 n.24 (citing, inter alia, Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
377. See id. at 788-89.
378. Id. at 787-88 n.26.
379. Id.
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proper question,... is not whether corporations 'have' First
Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are coextensive with
those of natural persons.... [I]nstead, the question must be whether
[the statute] abridges expression that the First Amendment was
meant to protect. 380 From this perspective, the Court saw corporate
speech on the referenda at issue in Bellotti to be precisely the kind of
expression the First Amendment was meant to protect: "The inherent
worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public
does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation,
association, union, or individual. 3 8' Since the identity of the
speaker is irrelevant to the value of the speech, social and political
speech is important enough to merit full First Amendment protection
even where the speakers are corporate entities. Thus, Bellotti is often
cited as a case that gave full First Amendment protection to
corporate social and political speech.38 2
From this Article's perspective, however, Bellotti is better read
for its promise that corporate social and political speech could be
regulated where the unregulated power of such speech perverted,
rather than served, First Amendment values. Though it found that
Massachusetts's statute failed strict scrutiny, the Court issued a
provocative reservation:
Appellee [Massachusetts] advances a number of arguments
in support of [its] view that [First Amendment] interests are
endangered by corporate participation in discussion of a
referendum issue. They hinge upon the assumption that
such participation would exert an undue influence on the
outcome of a referendum vote, and-in the end-destroy
380. 1d. at 776.
381. Id. at 777.
382. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good
For General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66
GEO. WASH. L. REv.' 235 (1998). Not everyone saw it as a positive
development. See id. at 257 n.162 ("[Bellotti] paid only lip service to the
rights of listeners" and served the interests of "the privileged few who can
spend unlimited amounts of money to purchase political effectiveness."
(quoting J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First
Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 641
(1982))); see also Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate
Political Expenditures and Redish's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L.
REv. 646, 662 (1981-1982) (providing a penetrating critique of Bellotti and
Professor Redish's views about corporate social and political speech).
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the confidence of the people in the democratic process and
the integrity of government. According to appellee,
corporations are wealthy and powerful and their views may
drown out other points of view. If appellee's arguments
were supported by record or legislative findings that
corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine
democratic processes, thereby denigrating rather than
serving First, Amendment interests, these arguments would
merit our consideration. But there has been no showing that
the relative voice of corporations has been overwhelming or
even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts,
or that there has been any threat to the confidence of the
citizenry in government.
383
The analysis provides a germ of a justification for regulating
corporate social and political speech. Indeed, it reveals, once again,
a latent sensitivity to the reality of the situational character in the
Court's First Amendment analysis. As my exegesis of the situational
character emphasized above, we have limited perceptive and
cognitive capacity. We are at least potentially vulnerable to being
"overwhelm[ed]" by some stimuli to the exclusion of being able to
reckon with others. That is all the Court recognized in Bellotti-but
it is a decisive commitment to reality.
384
383. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789-90 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Justice White dissented, criticizing the majority for not accepting evidence
before the Court that, prior to the enactment of the ban under review, corporate
expenditures on referendums had far outpaced that of other participants in such
referendums. See id. at 809-11. (White, J., dissenting). The majority rebutted
White, claiming that the Court had before it only incomplete information on
corporate and other expenditures on referendums, and that in any event it was
clear that corporate money was not such an influential voice in the referendum
after all, because the income tax referendum failed again in Massachusetts
while the case was pending, even though corporate money was not spent in the
referendum. Id. at 790 n.28. The Court apparently did not appreciate that
corporate expenditure in previous versions of the referendum, which also had
failed, may have had lasting effect on public opinion in subsequent
referendums.
384. Id. at 789-90. It is important to note that where the Court addresses
regulation of conventional commercial speech it looks at the falsity or
misleading nature of the speech, or the success of the regulation in advancing a
substantial government interest in a tailored fashion. See, e.g., Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68-72 (1983). Where the Court
addresses corporate political speech, however, these questions drop out of the
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This conception has not yet fully matured in First Amendment
theory, but it is budding. For example, in Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce,3 85 the Court upheld a Michigan law
prohibiting corporations from using funds from the corporate
treasury to support or oppose candidates for state offices. 386 The law
did permit expenditures from segregated corporate funds used solely
for political purposes.387 Justice Thurgood Marshall's opinion for the
Court in Austin relied first on the disproportionate power that
corporations have as a result of state conferred advantages provided
by the corporate form, and second on the reality of human limitations
respecting information processing. 388  The Court found that the
state's limitation on corporate political speech permissibly aimed to
remedy "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's
support for the corporation's political ideas."
38 9
picture and the Court focuses on the volume of such speech and its power to
potentially overwhelm or exclude other speech. See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at
789-90. So in the political speech context there is once again recognition of
the situational character, but it is a different aspect of the situational character,
one which does not require any argument about situational influence being
false or misleading, but rather simply that such influence is overwhelming,
therefore harming rdther than serving First Amendment interests.
385. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
386. Id. at 706.
387. Id.
388. Id. It might be thought that the "state conferred benefit" approach to
justifying the regulation of corporate political speech raises the "greater power
contains the lesser" analytic fallacy, but it does not. Government does not
have a right to regulate corporate speech simply because government could
crush corporations altogether. Rather, the Court accepts government's claim
that the very creation of corporate organizational forms without concomitant
speech regulation would powerfully distort important First Amendment values.
Id. at 659-60. Government is simply trying to create efficient business forms
that do not become Frankenstein monsters as far as First Amendment values
are concerned.
389. Id. at 660. The Court took pains to emphasize that the latitude it allows
for the regulation of political speech by profit-oriented business corporations
does not apply to the political speech of social and political organizations. See
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986)
(holding limitations on political speech by non-profit social and political
organizations to be unconstitutional).
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Professor Redish, disapproving of Austin, argues that in it "the
Court appears to have either ignored or at least partially abandoned
the principles it had wisely recognized in Bellotti."'3 90 I think that it
is better to say that the Court in Austin made good on the promise of
regulatory latitude that it very clearly made in Bellotti. Austin
suggests that the "overwhelm[ance]" idea from Bellotti survives to
provide a jurisprudential basis for the regulation of deep capture
advertising. 391 Today, there is substantial evidence that corporate
spending has come to dominate social and political debate in this
country to such an extent that it threatens to overwhelm other
voices.392 Corporate deep capture campaigns, replete with astro-turf
organizing, the riaintenance of front groups, and the sponsorship of
knowledge production at both think tanks and elite universities,
suggests that corporate advocacy of social and political interests is
far more pervasive and sophisticated than it was in 1978, when
Bellotti was decided.393 Whether the present Court would be willing
to make good on its reservation with respect to "overwhelming"
speech in Bellotti and Austin is questionable, but the theory
supporting it is sensible, and the evidence to invoke it is available.394
390. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 382, at 236.
391. Austin, 494 U.S. 659-60. In Bellotti, the Court also stated that a
corporation could be required to explicitly claim responsibility for the political
speech that it funded. 435 U.S. at 809. Such a requirement would serve the
information proliferating purpose of corporate political speech, but would not
be permitted with respect to speech by natural persons. Requiring the
prominent identification of corporate sponsorship in the deep capture
advertising such funding produces would go a significant way toward
combating the misleading nature of such advertising.
392. To further develop the "overwhelming" angle suggested by the Court in
Bellotti and employed in Austin, a satisfying inquiry must be guided by
contemporary teachings of social science. A simple tally of voices or an
accounting of money spent will not suffice. Rather, it must be recognized, for
reasons explained above, that the sophistication with which a corporate giant
develops and conveys "political speech" may be substantially greater than that
which a public interest group or politically motivated individuals can bring to
it.
393. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 21, at 213-33
(discussing the breadth of contemporary deep capture efforts).
394. Bellotti pertained to corporate financing of public referendum
campaigns. 435 U.S. 765 The kind of deep capture advertising that I have
highlighted in this section is generally not directed, at least explicitly, at the
advocacy of a particular referendum issue, or even a particular piece of
legislation. Rather, these advertisements, like those by the Center for
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In any event, I find cause for hope in Redish's lament that "although
the doctrinal messages sent by the Court undoubtedly have been
mixed, the modem trend appears unmistakably away from extending
full-fledged constitutional protection to corporate speech. 
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Redish takes issue with the "overwhelmance" approach in a
manner that might serve as a general rebuttal to the entire analytic
project advanced in this Article. Redish appreciates the logical
cogency of the "overwhelmance" approach to commercial speech
regulation, but insists that the evidence is indeterminate as to
whether such conditions obtain in contemporary society, with respect
to corporate speech; in the face of such ambiguity, we must err in
favor of allowing unfettered speech.396 For Redish, however, the
indeterminacy that he finds regarding the question of speech
"overwhelmance" is, in the end, a necessary conclusion. Indeed, he
concludes that critically driven inquiry of human perception and
Consumer Freedom, are directed at the development of public opinion in
furtherance of the corporate enterprise generally, whether it is in forestalling
regulation, legislation or referenda, or even more generally to perpetuate a
social atmosphere conducive to the consumption of corporate products. See
supra text accompanying notes 358-365. There is nothing in Bellotti's
principle that would, if the case were made, forestall its application to the kind
of deep capture advertising I am treating here. Fighting its way through
thickets of speech and association issues, the Court has allowed limitations on
some kinds of corporate political spending for good reason; once the problem
of deep capture is appreciated, these limitations can be extended to social issue
advertising as well.
395. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 382, at 238. Following Professor
Redish's example of restraint in his seminal commercial speech article, I will
stop short of claiming that political and social speech by corporations should
be subject to the exact same level of scrutiny as "common sense" commercial
speech, like product advertising. Determining the precise level of scrutiny
must be the subject of further theoretical elaboration, as would the design of a
programmatic regulatory approach to deep capture advertising, which may or
may not resemble the tombstone blues ban of junk-food advertising suggested
in this Article. See supra Part III.B.3.
396. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 382, at 289 (citations omitted) ("To
the extent that guaranteeing economically powerful corporations' First
Amendment rights would displace expression of others, the constitutional
analysis this Article adopts in the prior section might require revision. No one,
however, has made a persuasive argument-on either intuitive or empirical
grounds-that sucfi is actually the case.") (citations omitted). This is
reminiscent of Professor Redish's claim that the evidence is ambiguous as to
whether consumers are misled by tobacco advertising. See supra text
accompanying notes 199-200.
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information processing is impossible if the First Amendment is to be
preserved. We are bound, he insists, to our intuitive experience of
ourselves.397 "In short," Redish writes:
one cannot construe the First Amendment to allow the
government 'conclusively to determine either how citizens
process information or when the fear of an information
overload dictates a need for governmental intervention.
Society can never be sure that such a point ever exists,
much less that citizens have, in fact, reached it.
398
But what kind of conception of human agency would one have
to embrace to believe that we cannot be sure that "such a point ever
exists" at which human beings are beset with "information
overload?" Are we not finite beings-are our minds not limited?
Contrary to Redish's doubts, we can be certain that such a point
exists. Indeed, we must know that all of our thinking about the
world is shaped by our limited capacity to perceive and grapple with
all that is happening in it. Commercial speech analysis should begin
at precisely the place that Redish claims is off-limits to inquiry.
Redish argues:
[n]o matter how often or loudly one disseminates
expression... '[i]f democracy is to have meaning, we must
generally assume that speech affects voting behavior only
when it persuades.' Indeed, neither the First Amendment
nor the democratic system of which it is a part could
function under any other premise.
399
This is a debilitating presumption, an anti-liberal one in that it
insists on faith and the blind restraint of critical inquiry. In his
commercial speech analysis Redish is obsessed with consistency, but
it is hardly consistent with the principles behind the First
Amendment and the democratic system to accept ignorance due to
fear of the implications of examination. Indeed, Redish and other
commentators insist that a paternalistic purpose of maintaining
human ignorance for people's own good can never be countenanced
by the First Amendment-surely, then, such a purpose should not be
397. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 382, at 294-97.
398. Id. at 290 (quoting David Shelledy, Autonomy, Debate, and Corporate
Speech, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 541, 574 (1991)).
399. Id. at 268.
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countenanced at the core of First Amendment theory.
V. CONCLUSION: RESISTING DEEP CAPTURE
I have endeavored to elucidate a fresh understanding of the
commercial speech doctrine, one that abandons dispositionist
presumptions within the doctrine and accommodates the reality of
the situational character by developing situational sensitivity that is
already latent in the commercial speech doctrine. The tombstone
blues junk-food advertising ban provides an outline for a critical
realist approach to commercial speech regulation that could
effectively respond to the childhood obesity epidemic without
violating constitutional interests. The examination of deep capture
advertising provides a basis for understanding commercial speech
that goes beyond "common sense distinctions," and provides a more
critical approach to corporate social and political speech.
These arguments are made in a political climate that may have
little enthusiasm for their conclusions. Senator Harkin's proposal to
extend the FTC's regulatory authority over advertising directed at
children4°° may come to pass, but nothing like a tombstone blues
junk-food advertising ban appears on the horizon. Yet, I hope that
the analysis of the commercial speech doctrine advanced by this
article may have a progressive political effect, in that it may show
the possibility of a potent approach to regulating commercial speech
that will not offend constitutional values.
400. See supra note 160 (describing Harkin's proposal).
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